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Introduction
Neoclassical economic theory is characterized by complex models of super
rationality. Aumann (1997) summarizes ve main objections to such models:
 From casual empirical observation (or introspection), it is apparent that
most economic agents are not maximizers (i.e., they do not consider the
entire choice set and pick the maximal element from it).
 Maximization problems are complex, and even if one were willing, one
would in practice not be able to carry them out.
 Conclusions from rational analysis, in some cases, seem unreasonable
even on the basis of introspection.
 Laboratory experiments show that people fail to conform to some of
the basic assumptions of rational decision theory.
 Laboratory experiments indicate that the conclusions of rational anal-
ysis sometimes fail to adhere to \reality".
The nal two points relate to the contribution of behavioral and experi-
mental economics in challenging the neoclassical paradigm. For a long time,
there was growing skepticism about the assumptions employed in neoclas-
sical models, and ensuing conclusions. Justiably, if economics as a social
science is concerned with the investigation of human groups and individuals,
then the science should make a reasonable attempt to get this right. Thus,
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part of the growth in popularity of behavioral and experimental economics
is its endeavor not only at identifying anomalies in neoclassical models, but
also introducing psychological realism into these models.1 Specically, be-
havioral and experimental economics has proposed and tested a variety of
formulations (such as reciprocity and inequality aversion), that capture the
social nature of preferences.
One important element in this research eld is determining how commu-
nication aects behavior, taking into account that individuals are not merely
self-interested, but also value outcomes that accrue to other individuals. In
the utility maximization framework, communication is on the most part pre-
dicted not to inuence outcomes, since agents primarily pursue their private
interests. For example, in the trust game (Kreps, 1990), if the second mover
promises to honor trust conditional on the rst mover oering trust, then
the rst mover would not nd the second mover's promise to be credible
since keeping such a promise entails sacricing some material payo for the
second mover. Yet, if we stop at this prediction, we learn nothing about
the real world where communication plays a crucial role in maintaining the
functioning of the economic system. The present thesis therefore aims to
identify the incremental eect of communication on behavior of participants
in game experiments, taking into account social preferences, structures of
games, and underlying power hierarchies in a given game. It would be incor-
1For both general and specic discussions on whether models in economics and psychol-
ogy should represent \real world" phenomena, refer to Rubinstein (2006), Ainslie (2012),
and our own perspective (Musau, 2014b).
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rect, however, to imply that the level of importance given to communication
started with the rise to prominence of behavioral economics. Therefore, be-
fore summarizing our contribution in the thesis, we briey summarize the
role that information has played in economics, because a primary role of
communication is to convey information.
The central role of information in economics is attested by the existence
of an entire branch of microeconomic theory devoted to the study of how in-
formation aects economic decision-making and outcomes (information eco-
nomics). The branch was largely inspired by Hayek (1945)'s study which
explored the uses of information in ordering eective employment of soci-
etal resources. Hayek argued that a centrally planned system was bound to
fail since information that was needed to achieve an optimal allocation of
resources was \not given to a single mind". For him, the social planner's
problem would be reduced to one of logic if he started from a given system of
preferences and possessed all relevant information and knowledge of available
means. Subsequently, the notion of information as an economic commodity
arose, and a number of studies attempted formalizations of this idea into
theory. Robert Aumann, for example, considered a prototype in which a
nite number of information commodities are transacted in a competitive
environment. However, this and similar modeling attempts violated many
standard assumptions in microeconomic theory which are identied and dis-
cussed in Allen (1990), such as, the indivisibility of information structures,
price dependency of preferences for information, and valuation of identical
16
copies of the same information. In game theory, the role of information is
also central. Non-cooperative games, for example, are analyzed in terms of
what information players possess, and are subdivided into perfect informa-
tion games and imperfect information games. The economic literature on
perfect information games is vast, encompassing the areas of signaling and
screening.
With this background in hand, we summarize the organization of the
thesis: Chapter 1 begins by providing a survey of game experiments with
communication, focusing mainly on bargaining and trust games. It also
considers public-good games, matrix games, and coordination games, where
either there is substantial, or a growing body of research on the eect of
communication. The implementation of game experiments in economics is
described in detail, and the standard solutions of games are derived. Gen-
erally, communication is shown to have a positive eect on increasing dona-
tions in dictator games, increasing rates of cooperation in bargaining games,
trust games, and public goods games, and increasing coordination rates in
coordination games when the interests of players are closely aligned. How-
ever, some important considerations that have an eect on the result include,
whether communication is face-to-face or written, whether communication is
one-sided or two-sided, and the content of the communication (for example
whether participants discuss the game that is played, or whether they engage
in social communication).
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Chapter 2 is based on the working paper \Anticipated communication
in the ultimatum game", with Mario Capizzani (IESE Business School),
Luigi Mittone (University of Trento, Department of Economics and Man-
agement), and Antonino Vaccaro (IESE Business School). The paper in-
vestigates whether strategic considerations crowd out anticipatory eects of
communication in an ultimatum game. Previous studies in the dictator game
show that anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior. When an
allocator donates an amount of money to a recipient, and the recipient sends
an anonymous written message after learning of the amount, donations are
higher in relation to the standard (no-communication) condition. However,
in the extended environment of the ultimatum game, in determining what
proportion of endowment to oer, the proposer is not only concerned about
her pro-social behavior, but must factor in the possibility of her oer being
rejected by the responder. Such strategic considerations have been shown to
matter, and in a study examining the eect of anonymity on social distance,
it is observed that reducing social distance signicantly increases donations
in the dictator game, whereas in the ultimatum game, there is no signicant
eect on oers. We show that anticipated communication eects still persist
in the presence of two-sided communication in the ultimatum game.
Chapter 3 is based on the working paper \Communication, sequentiality
and strategic power: A prisoners' dilemma experiment", with Luigi Mittone.
Building on the study in Chapter 2, the study identies and implements an
experimental design that examines the role of rst-mover anticipated commu-
18
nication on the inter-player strategic power dynamics that exist in a symmet-
ric simultaneous move prisoners' dilemma, and a sequential move investment
game. One shot two-player sequential game experiments are characterized
by an asymmetry in the observed payos of participants. In the ultimatum
game, for example, the distribution favors rst-movers, whereas in the in-
vestment game, it favors second movers. A comparison to sequential move
games are symmetric simultaneous move games, which entail symmetry in
actions and payos. We show that rst-mover anticipated communication
has a signicant eect in inducing payo asymmetries in symmetric games.
19

Chapter 1
A survey of game experiments
with communication
This chapter considers the role of communication in bargaining and trust
game experiments. In particular, it identies the incremental eect of com-
munication on the behavior of participants in these experiments. To draw
analogies, public-good games, and matrix games (e.g., prisoners' dilemma,
coordination games, and zero-sum games) experiments are also considered,
but the treatment is more condensed. For each category of experiments,
both the structure of the underlying game (or a version of the general class
of games) and the standard game theory solution are presented. The latter
provides a basis for comparison with the experimental results. We attempt
as much as possible to provide a non-technical description of the games that
we consider and their solutions, in order to better focus attention on the
21
behavioral aspects of the results. The introduction begins by rst den-
ing communication and discussing issues that may arise if the experimenter
wishes to study its eect in an experiment.
The Merriam-Webster dictionary denes communication as \the act or
process of using words, sounds, signs, or behaviors to express or exchange in-
formation or to express ideas, thoughts, feelings, etc., to someone else." This
denition implies that communication can be split into verbal communication
and nonverbal communication. The rst category may be further subdivided
into oral communication (where spoken words are used e.g., face-to-face con-
versations, telephone conversations, voice over internet, radio, video) and
written communication (where written words are used e.g., letters, reports,
memos, faxes, emails, sms).1 Non verbal communication on the other hand
involves the sending or receiving of wordless messages (or any form of com-
munication other than oral or written), including, sign language (gestures),
body language, facial expression, tone of voice, posture, etc.
What emerges from the above denition is the broad nature of communi-
cation, and how implementing it in a laboratory setting may be problematic
in some instances. A key feature of laboratory experiments is that they
enable the investigator to achieve a controlled variation of a variable of inter-
est whilst keeping other (background) conditions xed. The assumption is
that an experiment that is well designed and executed exemplies a situation
where statistical relationships between variables represent underlying causal
1We do not include telegrams in this category because the year is 2015.
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relations (Guala, 2005). Communication in an experiment, thus, is what is
referred to as a \structural variable" (Camerer, 2003, p. 75). A structural
variable changes the structure of the underlying game (typically by adding
a move in the extensive-form representation of the game) as contrasted to a
descriptive variable that simply changes the way strategies are described.
To illustrate how communication may result in false cause-and-eect in-
ference in a game experiment setting, we consider an example where the
investigator wants to study the eect of communication on how much the
rst mover allocates to the second mover in an dictator game.2 However,
before the allocation is done, the second mover is given the opportunity to
talk face-to-face with the rst-mover. In this instance, there may be non-
pecuniary inuences on the rst-mover's preferences that the experimenter
introduces by allowing face-to-face communication. Suppose that the partic-
ipants in this experiment, as in most studies, attend the same college and are
able to identify each other once they meet face-to-face. As Camerer (2003,
p. 37) observes,
If the subjects know the identity of the person they are bargain-
ing with, their knowledge may inuence what they do for many
reasons. They may like how the person looks and want to make
them happy, or fear retribution or embarrassment if they make a
stingy oer and see the person after the experiment.
2For the reader unfamiliar with the dictator game, the structure is presented in the
immediately following section.
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Therefore, the amount the rst-mover allocates to the second-mover may
take into account future encounters between the two-parties outside the lab-
oratory. In such an instance, what may be inuencing observed behavior
may not be so much what is said between the rst-mover and the second-
mover and its result (i.e. the eect of communication), but the eect of
identication.
Other potential false inference issues that may arise if the experimenter
chooses face-to-face communication relate to the various levels of face-to-
face communication. If visual identication alone results in a non-signicant
dierence in contributions relative to when participants talk to each other
face-to-face, then the eect is not as a result of the content of the mes-
sages that are exchanged. An experimental design which does not include
a visual-identication-only treatment may erroneously attribute the eect of
observed behavior partly on the content of the messages, when in fact this
is not the case. Finally, it is noted that nonverbal responses at times con-
tradict verbal communication and hence aect the eectiveness of messages.
A famous example is the rst televised US presidential debate between the
then Sen. John F. Kennedy and vice president Richard Nixon. Don Hewitt,
who produced and directed the debate observed that
If you were watching television on the night of Sept. 26, 1960,
you probably thought that the young Sen. John F. Kennedy had
won that night's presidential debate. Yet if you heard the event
on radio, Vice President Richard M. Nixon was the clear winner
24
(CBS News , October 3, 2012).
The medium of communication may inuence perception, in this case the
message-content having a dominant eect over radio than over television.
How the experiment is designed to take into account these particular factors
is therefore important in ensuring that the experimenter achieves a controlled
variation of communication. An easy way out is to focus on written com-
munication and maintain anonymity between experimental participants, yet
this does not fully represent real-world environments where behavioral fac-
tors such as trust are important, e.g., in buyer-seller encounters, which in a
large number of cases are face-to-face.
The research strategy that we implement involves identifying major be-
havioral factors that have attracted a great deal of interest from experimental
economists, such as, altruism, reciprocity, and trust. We then critically re-
view design features and results of existing experimental studies that look at
the interaction between these factors and communication in games. Before
assessing the state of the art, we rst begin by describing the implementation
of game experiments.
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1.1 Implementation of game experiments in
economics
In a typical game experiment in economics, participants, usually students
pursuing a program of study at the college where the experimental labora-
tory is located, are randomly recruited from a pool of interested participants
who previously indicated their intent to take part in such experiments. In a
number of cases, the recruitment process may impose some restrictions with
respect to some attribute, e.g., maintaining a female to male gender ratio
of at least 4 : 6. Laboratories often utilize in-house recruitment and selec-
tion procedures, but increasingly, open source recruitment softwares such as
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) are employed to aid in the organization and man-
agement of the process.
Upon entering the laboratory, a participant is given a set of written in-
structions relating to the experiment to read through. The written instruc-
tions describe the decision tasks that the participant faces and the interaction
setting of the experiment. To ensure that participants have adequately un-
derstood the instructions, they are usually required to answer a set of control
questions relating to the contents of the instructions. The participants are
not allowed to participate in the experiment until they have correctly an-
swered all the control questions. Written instructions play an important
role in experiments in economics, but more so in game experiments. An
assumption in non-cooperative game theory is that players possess common
26
knowledge of the structure of the game, embodied in the common knowledge
of rationality assumption (Aumann, 1976). The instructions therefore serve
to familiarize participants with the environment of the game, and this is re-
inforced by the experimenter reading these instructions aloud at the start of
an experimental session.
Most game experiments in economics are incentivized, i.e., participants
are paid according to their payos in the experiment. This mechanism serves
to achieve control over preferences. However, as outlined in the introduction,
there are other external non-monetary factors that may inuence preferences
which experimental designs control for, one example being identiability.
Experiments therefore implement single-blind (information that could in-
troduce bias e.g, identity of the matched counterpart is withheld from the
experimental participants) or double-blind (withheld from the experimental
participants and the experimenter) designs to suppress such non-pecuniary
inuences on preferences. Additionally, a large number of game experiments
are held over a computer interface. Open source software such as z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007) are commonly used to program and implement experi-
ments. The usual experiment involves one or two populations of participants
repeatedly playing a one-stage game over several periods. For pairs of par-
ticipants playing several times, \reputation building" (or a repeated game
eect) can result in behavior that markedly diers from the stage-game equi-
librium that the experimenter wishes to study (Camerer, 2003). Therefore,
matching protocols aim to have participants play with each other only once in
27
each experimental session. The most common matching protocol implements
no-repeat matching (the so-called \stranger design")3.
1.2 Dictator and ultimatum games
The most widely studied of the experimental games, the ultimatum game,
takes a very simple form. The rst-mover (henceforth proposer) is asked to
divide a xed endowment, usually a sum of money, between herself and the
second-mover (henceforth responder). The responder can either accept or
reject the oer. Fig. 1.1 provides an extensive form representation of the
game. The endowment is set equal to 10 and the amount that the proposer
oers to the responder is denoted x, where x 2 [0; 10]. The continuum
of possible oers is represented by the shaded region in the gure. If the
responder accepts the proposer's oer, then he gets a payo of x, and the
proposer gets 10 x. If the responder rejects the oer, then both players get
a zero payo.
The dictator game on the other hand can be viewed as an ultimatum
game where the responder's option to reject an oer is removed. In eect, the
game is a one-player decision task where only the proposer has a substantive
3The strictest form of the stranger design is termed \perfect stranger" design where a
participant is matched with another participant at most once.
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Figure 1.1: The ultimatum game
role.4 Nevertheless, it is useful in identifying whether proposers' oers in the
ultimatum game stem from purely altruistic preferences or are a result of the
fear of rejection by responders.
Before reviewing the literature on behavior in ultimatum and dictator
games with communication, we briey summarize ndings for these games
without communication. For comparative purposes, it is useful to rst con-
sider what outcome predictions an analysis of these games would yield ap-
plying standard game theory. Selten's (?) notion of backward induction
provides a simple method to analyze the ultimatum game in Fig. 1.1. How-
4Strictly speaking, the dictator game does not constitute a proper game in the pure
game theoretic sense since the responder does not strategically inuence the outcome of
the game. To be a proper game, assuming a two-player game played by X and Y , the
payo of X should depend on the action (strategy) of Y . Similarly, the payo of Y should
depend on the action (strategy) of X.
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ever, before one can apply the concept in search of the subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE), assumptions regarding players' preferences are needed.
Standard game theory assumes that players maximize expected utility in
games. Therefore, players have well dened preferences over outcomes, and
these preferences are represented by utility functions dened over outcomes.
They choose strategies that earn them the highest expected payo consider-
ing the strategies of all other players in the game. What considerations enter
a particular player's utility function in practice may not be fully enumerated,
and standard game theory does not oer a guide as to what these considera-
tions are.5 Under standard theory, payos are exogenous and valued equally
by all players in the game. In experiments which use money, a simple solution
is to assume a one-to-one correspondence between utility and money. Figure
1.2 illustrates this assumption. Assume that the set of payos for each par-
ticipant in an experiment involves four dollar amounts f$1; $2; $3; $4g as
represented in the gure. The assumption is that these amounts correspond
to the utility set f1; 2; 3; 4g where the following preference ordering holds:
u(4)  u(3)  u(2)  u(1) . Thus, each player strictly prefers a higher dollar
amount relative to a lower dollar amount, is self-interested, and maximizes
monetary payos (since money corresponds to utility). We will refer to this
model as the money-maximizing model.
5Attempts to explicitly explore considerations that enter into players' utility functions
formed the basis of modern expected utility social preferences theories. It should be
noted, however, that these theories were developed to explain observed behavior and are
thus post-experimental theories of social preferences.
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Figure 1.2: Money maximizing model:
One-to-one correspondence assumption
The purely selsh money-maximizing model predicts that the outcome
where the proposer oers x = , and the responder accepts is an SPE of
the ultimatum game, where  is the smallest monetary amount that can
be oered (e.g. $0:25 from a $10 endowment). To see this, consider the
following: If the proposer (she) oers x = $0, she risks the responder rejecting
the oer, since rejecting yields the same amount for the responder (he) i.e.,
$0. The fact that the responder is self-interested implies that he does not
consider the proposer's payo when making his decision, and it does not
matter whether the proposer ends up with $10, if he accepts the x = $0 oer,
or $0 if he rejects the x = $0 oer. Thus, the responder will be indierent
between \accepting" or \rejecting" the oer and will toss a coin to determine
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which of the two options to choose. Tossing a coin yields an expected payo
of 1
2
($0) + 1
2
($10) = $5 for the proposer. Could the proposer do better?
Absolutely. She could oer $x =  (the smallest currency unit available)
which the responder will immediately accept because $ > 0. The proposer
gets $(10   ) (e.g., $9:75 if  = $0:25). Oers x >  yield a lower payo
for the proposer. In expected payos terms, the outcome (10   ; ) yields
the highest expected payo for the proposer who would determine this using
the backward induction process. She would subsequently use her rst-mover
advantage in the ultimatum game to achieve this allocation. In the dictator
game, the money-maximizing model predicts that the proposer would keep
the entire endowment since oers of x > 0 reduce the proposer's payo.
Camerer (2003) compiles statistics from a large number of studies of ulti-
matum games and observes, contrary to predictions of the money-maximizing
model, modal and median oers are mostly within 40{50 percent of the stakes
on oer, and mean oers are 30{40 percent. In addition, there are very few
oers of less than 10 percent, and of above 50 percent.
1.2.1 Dictator, ultimatum and other bargaining game
experiments with communication
Rankin (2006) considers a dictator game experiment in which some respon-
ders can request some specic portion of a $30 dollar initial endowment
from proposers. He implements \anonymous" treatments and \face-to-face"
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treatments. Thus, in the anonymous treatments, responders ll in a reporting
card, completing the sentence, \I request US$:::". The card is then forwarded
to the proposer by a courier, and the proposer at no time knows the identity
of the responder she is paired with. In the face-to-face treatment, the respon-
der lls in the same reporting card, but delivers it himself to the proposer
with the appropriate participant number. No other form of communication is
allowed. In total, the experiment includes four treatments: anonymous-and-
no-request, anonymous-and-request, face-to-face-and-no-request, and face-
to-face-and-request. Rankin nds that mean requested amount by respon-
ders is higher under anonymous interaction relative to face-to-face interaction
($ 15.60 compared to $ 13.85 ). However, there is no signicant dierence in
mean oers when requests are made anonymously or face-to-face ($ 7.90 and
$ 8.10 respectively). Signicantly, face-to-face interaction in the absence of
a request results in the highest mean oer across all four conditions ($11.70)
whereas the standard dictator game protocol of anonymous interaction and
no request results in the lowest mean oer (only $1.89).
Mohlin and Johannesson (2008) investigate the eect of anonymous writ-
ten communication on donation levels in the dictator game. In the experi-
ment, the proposer has to decide how to allocate an endowment of SEK. 120
between herself and the responder. In the rst of two communication treat-
ments, responders send a written message to proposers prior to proposers
deciding on the allocation, where there is no restriction on the content of
the message. In the second treatment, the proposer receives a written mes-
33
sage from a third party (a previous responder) before the allocation decision,
and this is common knowledge. Mohlin and Johannesson nd that written
messages from responders to proposers increase the proportion of proposers
who donate some amount of money relative to no-communication from 42
percent to 58 percent, whereas average donations increase from 12.73 percent
to 22.13 percent respectively. When communication is from third parties to
proposers, there is also an increase in the proportion of proposers who do-
nate some amount of money relative to no-communication from 42 percent
to 53 percent, and average donations increase from 12.73 percent to 18.18
percent. Therefore, Mohlin and Johannesson suggest that it is not the \re-
lationship eect" of communication that is relevant in raising donations but
the impersonal content of the communication.
Andersen et al. (2011) experimentally examine the eect of communica-
tion in a dictator game where either the proposer or responder can send a
written message to the counterpart before the proposer decides on how to
allocate a $10 endowment between herself and the responder. The experi-
ment includes four communication treatments: \Ask" { where the responder
sends a written message along with a request for a given amount of the en-
dowment to the proposer who reads it before making her decision; \Explain"
{ where the proposer sends a written message to the responder along with
the allocation decision (responder stays silent); \Ask then Explain" { where
the responder rst sends a written message and a request for a given amount
of the endowment and thereafter the proposer makes her decision accom-
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panied by a written reply message to the responder; \Explain then Ask" {
where the proposer rst sends a written message along with a \non-binding
allocation" to the responder who then responds with a written message and
a numerical request, and then nally the proposer makes her decision. The
base treatment is the standard protocol with no communication.
Andersen et al. nd that the average allocation with no communication
is $1:53 which is signicantly lower than in all communication treatments
except \Explain" where the mean allocation is just $0.65. Mean allocation
rates are highest in the treatments where there is two-way communication
i.e. \Ask then Explain" and \Explain then Ask" (over $ 2.50 in both treat-
ments), and over $2.25 in the \Ask" treatment. They analyze the content of
responders' communication and nd that the model message is a request for
the equal split of the endowment. Notably, in treatments where the responder
has a voice (all 3 communication treatments except \Explain"), the mean al-
location and proportion of equal split oers is signicantly higher than in the
treatments where the responder can not speak (baseline no-communication
and \Explain"). Andersen et al. thus conclude that asking is powerful. How-
ever, there is a caveat to this result: Andersen et al. observe that asking for
more than the equal split typically results in nothing in return. They con-
clude that communication has a signicant inuence on altruistic behavior,
and this appears to mainly work by increasing empathy.
Bohnet and Frey (1999a) implement three treatment conditions in the
standard dictator game: \anonymity", \mutual identication" and \commu-
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nication". In the anonymity condition, participants play the dictator game
under standard procedure. The mutual identication condition entails par-
ticipants visually identifying each other but there is no verbal communication
between them, whereas in the communication condition, participants inter-
act face-to-face with verbal communication allowed. Proposers are given
envelopes containing an endowment of CHF. 13 and decide how much to al-
locate to responders. Bohnet and Frey nd that there is an increase in the
proportion of endowment allocated to the responder from 26 percent under
no-communication to 50 percent under mutual identication. The propor-
tion allocated under communication is 48 percent, which is higher than the
proportion under no communication but not signicantly dierent to the
proportion under mutual identication. Therefore, they conclude that silent
identication (and not face-to-face communication per se) is sucient to
raise contribution rates in dictator games. In particular, Bohnet and Frey
note that identication strengthens social or cultural propensities for fairness
and decreases social distance, thereby allowing emergence of empathy for the
counterpart.
Croson et al. (2003) modify the standard ultimatum game to allow re-
sponders to receive an outside option in case of rejection.6 They consider a
two-sided imperfect information setting: known or unknown amounts to be
6An outside option in the ultimatum game can be seen as potentially having two eects:
it allows a responder to punish a proposer who makes small oers without the responder
hurting himself, and it makes explicit this possibility to the proposer, who must then factor
it in when making an oer.
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divided (endowments), and known or unknown amounts of the outside op-
tions. Participants play the same role with the same partner initially for two
rounds, and then a further two rounds, and responders are allowed to send
a written message to proposers prior to the proposers making an oer. In
turn, proposers have the option to reply (in writing) to the responders' mes-
sages in conjunction with their oers. The design allows lies about private
information to be uncovered and to be punished. In some treatments, the
size of either the outside option, the initial endowment, or both are revealed
to proposers and responders after the second round. Croson et al. nd that
about half of the responder's communication includes a threat to reject an
oer across all four rounds of the experiment, and both responders' and pro-
posers' messages include a lie, averagely about slightly less than 20 percent
of the time in the rst two rounds (before revelation of private information)
and about 10 percent of the time in the nal two rounds.
Responders in the experiment threaten to reject small oers about 50
percent of the time, and despite the threats, proposers make smaller oers
(relative to what is requested) in 30 percent of the cases.7 Croson et al. clas-
sify short-run eects of communication and long-run eects. In the short-run,
responder's lies about their outside options signicantly increase the oers
7In game theory, a player who makes a threat that he cannot stand up to is referred to
as making an incredible threat. For example, in the ultimatum game in Fig. 1.1, assuming
that the monetary values represent utilities, if the responder threatens to reject an oer
x =  > 0, then the proposer would consider this as an incredible threat since  is greater
than the responder's payo of zero in case of rejection. The proposer would proceed to
oer x = , an act that is termed as \calling the threat" (similar to \calling a blu").
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that they receive (relative to no-communication) whereas responder's threats
increase oers only marginally but signicantly reduce the probability of ac-
ceptance. Proposers' lies on the other hand result in signicantly lower oers
and no change in the probability of acceptance. In the long run, responder
revealed lies result in smaller but not signicantly dierent oers relative to
no-communication in the proceeding rounds (i.e. round 3 and 4), whereas
proposer revealed lies result in signicantly larger oers and a signicantly
higher likelihood of rejection of the amounts oered. A possible reason that
Croson et al. attribute to the lack of an observed eect as it relates to re-
sponder lies is the small size of outside options relative to the possible gains
from trade (i.e. the relative unimportance of the lies as it relates to their
eect on overall dollar payos in the game).
Roth (1995) examines how a particular form of face-to-face communica-
tion inuences cooperation in bargaining. In the baseline treatment, bargain-
ing is anonymous and there is no communication. The two communication
treatments dier only in terms of restrictions imposed on the content of
the communication: In the restricted treatment, participants are allowed to
communicate to each other face-to-face prior to the start of play but they
are not allowed to talk about any aspect of the bargaining game. For a
2-minute time interval, groups of participants are thus required to famil-
iarize themselves with the names of other members in the group, and the
year of study but cannot discuss the bargaining game. In the unrestricted
treatment, there are no restrictions on what participants can talk about.
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They thus can discuss the bargaining game or anything else. Roth nds that
\social" communication results in the same level of cooperation (measured
in terms of agreement frequencies) as \game related communication" in bar-
gaining games. Overall, communication results in higher rates of cooperation
relative to no communication with agreement frequencies of over 90 percent
in both communication treatments compared to only 67 percent under no
communication. However, Roth further notes that the presence of game-
related communication although not resulting in signicantly dierent rates
of cooperation compared to social communication may have aected the dis-
tribution of oers in the bargaining game. He nds that the percentage of
equal-split oers are signicantly higher under game-related communication
relative to both social communication and no communication, but due to a
small sample size, the relevance of this result is unknown.
Zultan (2012) considers a similar experiment to Roth (1995) by com-
paring the eects of face-to-face restricted (social) communication and unre-
stricted (strategic) communication in the ultimatum game. In the \restricted
communication" treatment, participants mainly discuss their elds of study
alongside their experiences as students via a video link for a 2 minute du-
ration, but they cannot discuss strategies in the ultimatum game. In the
\unrestricted communication" treatment, participants can discuss strategies
in the ultimatum game or anything else via a video link for 2 minutes. The
no-communication treatment entails the standard ultimatum game protocol,
with a 2 minute wait time before the proposer can make an oer. The pro-
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poser endowment is 90 experimental currency units (ECU) and the strategy
method is employed to elicit the full vector of the responder. Therefore, the
proposer chooses one of 17 possible divisions of the 90 ECU, and for each
division, without knowing the actual choice of the proposer, the responder
has to indicate whether he accepts or rejects the division.
Zultan nds that communication results in signicantly higher oers than
no communication, with no signicant dierence between oers in the re-
stricted condition and the unrestricted condition (over half of oers are at
the 50:50 split in both the restricted and unrestricted conditions compared
to only 9 percent under no communication). The result qualitatively mirrors
proposer behavior in Roth's experiment. However, he nds that responders
behave signicantly less cooperatively in the unrestricted condition compared
to both under restricted communication and no communication. The mean
acceptance threshold, dened as the smallest proportion of the endowment
that a responder is prepared to accept, is 32.2 percent in the unrestricted
condition, which is signicantly higher than in both the restricted condition
and under no communication (23.8 percent and 20.6 percent, respectively).
Zultan thus concludes that pre-play communication eects may be the out-
come of strategic and social-aective processes, or an interaction of both.
Strategic (game-related) communication aects the way in which the play-
ers consider social norms, whereas social (non game-related) communication
induces cooperative behavior through other-regarding preferences.
Rankin (2003) considers the eect of communication in the form of written
40
requests from responders in the ultimatum game. His two experimental con-
ditions include \request" { where responders can request a specic amount
of the endowment by lling a reporting card, completing the sentence, \I
request $:::", and \no request" { which entails the standard ultimatum game
procedure without communication. Both treatments maintain anonymity be-
tween participants. The endowment to proposers is equal to $ 30. Proposers
record their donations on recording cards, completing the sentence \My oer
is $:::", and these are forwarded to responders who decide on whether to
accept or reject the oers. Rankin nds that oers and rejection rates in the
no request condition are consistent with past results from ultimatum games.
Averagely, proposers contribute $ 12.67 or 42 percent of their endowment,
and 24 percent of oers are rejected by responders. In the request condition,
the mean oer is $ 10.09 or 33.6 percent of the endowment, signicantly
lower than in the no request condition, and 35 percent of oers are rejected.
He concludes that requests adversely aect average oers in the ultimatum
game.
Brosig et al. (2004) investigate the eect of communication in two-stage
sequential-bargaining game experiments which incorporate reputation and
punishment. In these games, rst-movers choose one of two decision nodes,
and second-movers choose one of two options which decide nal payo al-
locations. The games are such that there is a conict between the players
inherent in the monetary payo structure (rst-movers have a preference
for one Nash equilibrium in one subgame whereas the second-movers have
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a preference for another Nash equilibrium in a dierent subgame). Punish-
ment arises since the second-mover has a chance to choose the strategy that
yields a lower payo for both players if the rst-mover chooses her preferred
subgame (as opposed to the subgame that favors the second-mover).8 Con-
currently, second movers can reward rst movers for choosing the subgame
preferred by the former (through choosing the ecient-equal split outcome),
although this again entails second-movers sacricing some of their material
payos. Only the rst-movers preferred equilibrium is subgame perfect.
Two pre-play communication treatments are implemented in the experi-
ment: written (email) communication and face-to-face (via a video link) com-
munication, alongside the base no-communication treatment. In the written
communication treatment (as well as no communication), anonymity between
participants is maintained. Further, Brosig et al. consider games with dif-
ferent eciencies of punishment. They nd that in the absence of commu-
nication, rst-movers overwhelmingly choose the subgame perfect strategy,
over two thirds of the time across all punishment eciency conditions. Un-
der face-to-face communication, there is a reversal: rst-movers play their
preferred subgame perfect strategy in only 13 out of 106 games (less than
an eighth of the time), and second movers exploit rst movers by not choos-
ing the ecient equal-split outcome only in 4 out of 93 cases (less than 5
percent of the time). In the anonymous written communication treatments,
8Therefore, this feature of the sequential-bargaining game is similar to ultimatum bar-
gaining since second-movers sacrice some of their payos in order to punish rst movers.
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rst-movers play their preferred subgame perfect strategy less than a quarter
of the time, and the results generally mirror those under face-to-face commu-
nication (although the rates are higher in the face-to-face condition). Brosig
et al. note that if reputation drove the results in the face-to-face condition,
then behavior in the anonymous written communication treatment should
not be dierent from behavior under no-communication. Since the results
overwhelmingly reject this conclusion, they rule out reputation eects as a
signicant driver of the communication eect.
Greiner et al. (2012) address the incongruence between Brosig et al.'s
result that lifting anonymity (via a video screen) does not enhance con-
tributions and Roth's result that face-to-face communication induces near
equal-split oers in ultimatum bargaining. They note that either experiment
in isolation cannot disentangle the eect of strategic eects of non-verbal
communication (and reputation concerns) versus changes in preferences trig-
gered by personalized information, since the former may still be present in
ultimatum and public good games, and mere visual identication may not be
sucient to trigger the latter. Therefore, Greiner et al. (2012) suggest study-
ing one-way responder communication in a dictator game (to rule out strate-
gic eects of communication), and introduce two responders into the game
(to study the eect of discrimination between two responders). Therefore, an
anonymous proposer decides how to split an endowment of 17 Euros between
herself and the two responders. The experiments includes two communica-
tion treatments: \visual," - where the proposer can see both responders
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via a video link but without any audio channel, and \audio-visual," where
the proposer can see both responders but can only hear one of them speak.
The baseline is the standard dictator game protocol with no communication.
Greiner et al. nd that donations are on average 8 percent higher in the visual
treatment compared to no-communication, whereas they are 14 percent and
28 percent higher for the non-talking and talking responder, respectively, in
the audio-visual treatment. Thus, the ndings replicate the result that mere
visual exposure does not greatly aect social giving. In addition, Greiner
et al. speculate that guilt aversion may have driven increased giving in the
audio-visual treatment, noting that video messages may serve as a channel to
inuence the proposer's beliefs about the responder's expectation, thereby in-
uencing contributions. Proposers' discrimination (dierences in allocations
between the responder pair) on the other hand signicantly increases with
the addition of the visual channel, thus providing evidence that proposers
respond to the communication, even if they do not generally become more
generous towards responders.
Valley et al. (2002) study the eect of communication in a buyer-seller
bargaining experiment under incomplete information. Buyers and sellers
draw values in the range 0   $50 and subsequently bargain by stating bids.
The experiment consists of seven rounds, and buyers are matched with
a dierent seller at each round (perfect stranger matching). In the no-
communication treatment, players are given two minutes to arrive at a bid.
There are two communication treatments: written-communication and face-
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face communication. In the former, players send written messages to each
other (through a courier) for a 13 minute duration before submitting a bid.
In the latter, players are allowed to talk to each other face-to-face, and com-
munication is unrestricted, after which they return to separate rooms and
submit a nal bid. Valley et al. nd that communication generally enhances
the eciency of trade. In the communication treatments, only one third of
participants truthfully reveal their true values and about the same proportion
actively lie about their value. Therefore, Valley et al.'s analysis shows that
eciency does not emerge from mutual truth telling (mutual revelation of
values) but through a dierent mechanism: specically, communication aids
bargainers to coordinate on a single price that is common (one-price equilib-
rium), and this occurs approximately 40 percent of the time under written
communication and approximately 70 percent of the time under face-to-face
communication.
A detail that is hidden in the above description relates to dierences be-
tween written communication and face-to-face communication. Bargaining
in the written-communication treatment is more ecient relative to the no-
communication treatment only when the potential gains from trade are small.
When potential gains from trade are large, the opposite holds: bargaining in
the no-communication treatment is more ecient than under written commu-
nication. Valley et al. show that the higher eciency is due to coordination
to the one-price equilibrium discussed above, whereas the lower eciency
is due to high rates of deception in the written communication treatment.
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This is not the case when communication is face-to-face, where bargaining
is more ecient relative to no communication both when the potential gains
from trade are large and when they are small. This increased eciency is
achieved through high levels of coordination coupled with low rates of decep-
tion when parties interact face-to-face.
1.2.2 Other relevant dictator and bargaining game ex-
periments without verbal communication
Because face-to-face communication entails visual identication between the
communicating parties, it is also useful to explore experiments that manipu-
late identiability, but where participants do not communicate verbally. For
example, as we have argued in the introductory section, if the experimenter
observes signicantly higher mean contributions in a face-to-face communica-
tion treatment in the dictator game where participants communicate verbally,
then in the absence of a treatment which only includes visual-identication
(without any verbal communication), she cannot attribute the eect to ver-
bal communication. Yet, there is a communication eect (since participants
are communicating face-to-face). The issue here is one of denition, i.e., con-
stituting what makes up face-to-face communication. Therefore one should
consider an aggregate face-to-face communication eect, and further subdi-
vide this into a visual identication eect and a verbal communication eect
(or what is sometimes referred to as a \content eect"). Here, we review
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some experiments that have attempted to isolate and investigate the former
eect.
Bohnet and Frey (1999b) vary the degree of social distance in a dic-
tator game experiment by considering two identication treatments: \one-
way identication" { where the proposer can visually identify the responder
but the responder does not know the identity of the proposer; and \two-
way identication" { where both the proposer and responder can visually
identify each other. There is no verbal communication of any sort in both
treatments. They compare behavior in these two treatments to that in the
baseline anonymity treatment. Bohnet and Frey nd that out of an initial
endowment of CHF. 13, on average, proposers allocate 26 percent of the en-
dowment to responders in the anonymity condition, compared to 35 percent
under one-way identication and 50 percent under two-way identication.
Two-way identication results in over two thirds of donations at the equal-
split compared to 39 percent under one-way identication and 25 percent
under anonymity. In an additional one-way identication treatment where
proposers are provided additional information on the responders that they
are paired with, mean contributions increase to 52 percent of the endowment,
exceeding the mean contribution under two-way identication. Bohnet and
Frey note that one-way identication excludes the potential for future sanc-
tions, and thus \transforms anonymous, faceless entities into visible, specied
human beings" (p. 339). Their one-way identication results rule out reci-
procity and fairness reference points, and thus the relevance of these factors
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as the driving force in decreasing social distance and increasing contributions
in the dictator game.
Bolton and Zwick (1995) test two hypotheses of why results in the ul-
timatum game experiments divert from the perfect equilibrium prediction.
The rst, labeled \anonymity hypothesis," posits that participants' money
maximizing objective is distorted by the act of experimental observation.
The second, termed \punishment hypothesis," contends that participants
are willing to punish those who treat them \unfairly" independent of any
experimenter inuence. Due to what Bolton and Zwick refer to as cost and
time considerations, they run a modication of the standard ultimatum game
where proposers can choose either an equal allocation of a $ 4 endowment at
any period, represented by the payo vector (2; 2), or they can choose an un-
equal allocation of the same amount at experimental period t, represented by
the payo vector ht = (ht;1; ht;2), where ht;1 is the proposer's share of the en-
dowment at t and ht;2 is the responder's share at t satisfying ht;1+ht;2 = 4 and
ht;1 > ht;2 > 0. The experiment is run under several alternative values of ht,
e.g., (2:20; 1:80), (2:60; 1:40), (3; 1), etc. If the responder accepts at a period
t, then the chosen allocation is implemented, either (2; 2) or (ht;1; ht;2). If the
responder rejects, the payo vector (0; 0) is implemented. The experiment
includes three conditions, (i) participant-experimenter anonymity absent, (ii)
participant-experimenter anonymity present, and (iii) the game minus the re-
sponder's punishment strategy and participant-experimenter anonymity ab-
sent.
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Bolton and Zwick nd that across the last 5 periods of the game, the
results from condition (i) qualitatively mirror those of standard ultimatum
game experiments, for example, 50 percent of oers are equilibrium oers,
20 percent of oers are rejected by responders, and equal-divisions are never
rejected. In condition (ii) where anonymity is present, 66 percent of oers
are equilibrium oers, and 20 percent of oers are rejected by responders,
so perfect equilibrium outcomes rise to 46 percent relative to 30 percent in
condition (i). The dierence is signicant, but Bolton and Zwick note that
the anonymity hypothesis explains only a small fraction of non-equilibrium
play (about 23 percent). Finally, in condition (iii), all oers are equilibrium
oers in the nal 5 periods despite the fact that participant-experimenter
anonymity is absent. Bolton and Zwick thus conclude that anonymity is
relatively unimportant in explaining non-equilibrium play in the ultimatum
game, and observe that the punishment hypothesis explains the majority of
deviation.
Burnham (2003) examines both the role of and perceptions of anonymity
on pro-social behavior in a dictator game experiment. He implements two
double blind treatments, where either the proposer or the responder can view
a picture of the counterpart, and a baseline double blind pictureless treat-
ment. The proposer endowment is equal to $ 10. Burnham nds that in ex-
cess of half of the proposers give nothing to responders across all three treat-
ments, implying that one-way identication under strict anonymity (double
blind design) does not change the percentage of participants who give. The
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modal allocation is $ 5 in both picture treatments relative to $ 2 in the
pictureless treatment. However, mean amounts do not vary much between
treatments resulting from the high concentration of $ 0 contributions, with
the lowest amount of $1.19 being contributed in the pictureless treatment
compared to $1.96 when the responder's photo is shown, and $1.71 when the
proposer's photo is shown. He concludes that contrary to Bolton and Zwick
(1995)'s conclusion, anonymity is an important consideration in determining
how much is contributed in the dictator game (altruism) since more than
half of proposers keep everything under double blind conditions. However,
for those proposers who do choose to contribute some positive amount, the
modal division is an even split in the picture treatments similar to what is
observed in face-to-face experiments.
Homan et al. (1994) conduct double blind dictator game experiments
where the experimenter cannot identify the proposer. In their "contest en-
titlement" treatment, participants answer current events questions, and the
top ranked participants who score highest in this quiz \earn" the right to be
proposers in the game.9 Additionally, participants earn $0.25 extra for each
9To motivate this property rights treatment, Homan et al. note that in bargaining
experiments, participants' expectations may be more compatible, and proposers less inu-
enced by the possibility of punishment strategies by responders if proposers have earned
the right to their roles in the game (as opposed to being randomly assigned the right),
and if this right acquisition is common knowledge.
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correct answer.10 The "random entitlement" treatment entails the standard
procedure of randomly assigning participants into the position of proposer
and responder. Proposers are endowed with $ 10. Homan et al. nd that
the contest entitlement signicantly lowers the distribution of donations in
the dictator game relative to random entitlement. In the contest entitle-
ment treatment and when the experimenter can identify proposers, about 40
percent of proposers oer $ 0 compared to 20 percent under random entitle-
ment. 80 percent of proposers oer $ 2 or lower under contest entitlement,
whereas about 20 percent of proposers allocate half of the endowment to
responders under random entitlement. When the experimenter cannot iden-
tify proposers (double-blind treatments), Homan et al. observe by far the
largest incidence of self-regarding contributions. For example, in one of the
double blind treatments, over two-thirds of proposers donate $ 0 and 84 per-
cent donate $1 or less. The signicantly smaller oers are observed in both
random entitlement and contest entitlement treatments.
Eckel and Grossman (1996) run a dictator experiment where the respon-
der in one treatment is an anonymous individual, whereas in a separate
treatment, the responder is an established charity. Proposers are asked to
allocate a $ 10 amount, and behavior in the two treatments is compared.
They nd that 30 out of 48 participants (62.5 percent) keep the entire en-
10There is evidence that participants regard the role of proposer as more valuable than
the role of responder in the ultimatum game (Guth and Tietz, 1986). This in itself should
be motivation enough for participants to answer questions correctly. However, making no
assumptions as to how participants value the relative positions, Homan et al.'s payment
for each right answer acts to incentivize participants to compete for the role of proposer.
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dowment, and the mean donation is 10.6 percent of the endowment when the
responder is an anonymous individual. However, when the responder is an
identied registered charity, only 27.1 percent of participants keep the entire
endowment and the mean donation is 31 percent of the endowment. Eckel
and Grossman note that when the responder is agreed to be \deserving,"
donations increase signicantly and thus they conclude that participants are
rational in the sense that they incorporate fairness into their decisions.
Charness and Gneezy (2008) vary anonymity and social distance in dicta-
tor game and ultimatum game experiments. Employing a 22 experimental
design, they vary the game (dictator or ultimatum) and anonymity (family
name of responder provided to proposer or not provided). Proposers were
endowed with 100 points in all 4 conditions, and had to decide how many
points to allocate to responders. They nd that 43 percent (13 of 30) of
the proposers in the name treatment allocate at least 50 percent of the en-
dowment to responders, compared to only 20 percent (6 of 30) in the no
name treatment. The mean contribution in the no-name condition is 18.3
points compared to 27.2 points when proposers know the family name of
the responder. However, the results in the ultimatum game are markedly
dierent. Charness and Gneezy nd that mean amounts allocated in the
ultimatum game do not signicantly dier between the two anonymity con-
ditions (43.2 points in the no-name treatment compared to 45.3 points in the
name treatment). 50 percent of proposers allocate half of their endowment
to responders in the no-name treatment compared to 63.3 percent in the
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name treatment. They conclude that the absence of a signicant eect on
the oers across treatments in the ultimatum game suggests that strategic
considerations crowd out altruistic impulses.
Small and Loewenstein (2003) manipulate a weak form of identiability
where the proposer either donates to a responder who is already determined
or one who is yet to be determined in the dictator game. In the determined
treatment, each participant is given a $ 10 endowment in an envelope, and
draws a number labeled 1{10 from a bag. Thereafter, participants draw cards
labeled either \KEEP" or \LOSE" from a bag, and the KEEP participants
get to keep their endowment and number cards. The LOSE participants
return the envelopes containing their endowments to the experimenter, and
deposit their number cards in a bag. Each KEEP participant then draws
one of the number cards deposited by the LOSE participants, and is paired
with that particular LOSE participant. The KEEP participant are then as-
signed the role of proposer and play the dictator game with the paired LOSE
participant as responder. In the undetermined treatment, the KEEP partic-
ipants are told that they will be linked with one LOSE participant by having
the KEEP participant draw one of the LOSE participant's numbers from
the bag. However, they are informed that they have to play the dictator
game before the actual draw occurs. Therefore, in the determined condition,
proposers already know the number (but not the identity) of the paired re-
sponder whereas in the LOSE condition, they are yet to know the number
of the paired responder. Small and Loewenstein nd that the mean contri-
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bution of $ 3.42 in the determined condition is signicantly higher than $
2.12 in the undetermined condition. 46.1 percent of donations in the deter-
mined condition are at the equal split of $ 5 or above, compared to only 18.9
percent in the undetermined condition. They conclude that determining the
responder without providing any personalizing information{ increases caring.
Kogut and Ritov (2005a) run an experiment to investigate the general-
ity of Small and Loewenstein's result that identifying responders results in
increased donations in the dictator game. In the experiment, they employ a
2 4 design where they vary singularity of the responder (single vs. a group
of eight individuals) and identifying information (unidentied; age only; age
& name; age& name & picture). All participants (proposers) are told that
the responder needs medical care, but the cost is beyond the means of the
responder. They are then asked how much they are willing to donate to help
the responder. Kogut and Ritov nd that mean willingness to contribute
(WTC) is highest when the responder is identied by age, name and a pic-
ture (63.69), and lowest when the responder is identied only by age, and
when the responder is unidentied (36.87 and 45.68, respectively { where this
dierence is not signicant). Further, they nd that whether the responder is
a single individual or whether the responder is a group of 8 individuals does
not have a signicant main eect on WTC. They note that the lack of a sig-
nicant singularity eect indicates quantity neglect. Further analysis shows
an interaction between the type of identifying information and singularity.
Specically, when the responder is a single individual (but not the group of
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individuals), identication by age, name, and picture results in a signicantly
higher WTC relative to both unidentied and identied by age only. Kogut
and Ritov conclude that the eect of identication in the dictator game may
be largely restricted to single responders, and that identication of the single
responder is more eective the more vivid the representation.11
1.3 Trust games
Trust is another important dimension of social preferences and it has in-
evitably attracted a number of experiments with communication. However,
as we did in the previous section, we will rst summarize ndings of trust
games without communication and then assess how the behavior of players
changes once communication is added into the mix. Earlier trust experi-
ments employed versions of Kreps' (1990) trust game such as exhibited in
Fig. 1.3. In this game, the rst-mover (henceforth trustor) can choose one of
two actions: \trust" or \don't trust". If the trustor chooses not to trust the
second-mover (henceforth trustee), then both players get a payo of ve. If
the trustor chooses to trust the trustee, then the payos depend on the ac-
tion taken by the trustee. The trustee (she) can choose to honor the trustor's
trust in which case each player gets a payo of 10, or she may choose not
to honor the trustor's trust. If this happens, then the trustor gets a zero
payo and the trustee gets a payo of 14. The trust game in Fig. 1.3 cap-
11Kogut and Ritov (2005b) is a related paper that considers the singularity eect in
separate versus joint evaluations.
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tures an essential element of trust in the sense that the trustor (he) will
choose the action \trust" only if he strongly believes that the trustee will
honor trust. Before analyzing the predicted outcome of the game using the
money-maximizing model described in the previous section, we identify a de-
fect inherent in Kreps' trust game and introduce a game which has become
the standard behavioral measure of trust among experimental economists.
Figure 1.3: A version of Kreps' trust game
Suppose, for example, that the trustor believes that there is a positive
probability of the trustee honoring trust in the game in Fig. 1.3, but this
belief is weak. What should he do? He has only two choices: to trust or not
to trust. Let us assume that the trustor assigns a probability p = 0:4 to the
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trustee honoring trust. Being an expected utility maximizer, he will compare
his outside payo of 5 (payo under the action \don't trust") to 0.4(10) +
0.6(0) =4 in which case he still decides not to trust. Notice that all beliefs
with p < 0:5 automatically result in the trustee choosing the \don't trust"
action { implying zero trust even though the trustor does weakly trust the
trustee. The opposite argument can be advanced for beliefs with p > 0:5,
where it might seem that the trustor fully trusts the trustee in cases where
p 2 (0:5; 1), e.g., p = 0:7, even though the trustors' beliefs entail an element
of mistrust.
Figure 1.4: The investment game
57
Recognizing the fact that Kreps' trust game does not allow for the iden-
tication of intermediate trust preferences, Berg et al. (1995) suggested the
investment game exhibited in Fig. 1.4. In this game, the trustor has the
choice to send some part, none, or all of the initial endowment (set equal
to 10 in Fig. 1.4). The amount that the trustor sends is denoted x where
x 2 [0; 10]. The continuum of possible trustor oers is represented by the
shaded upper part of Fig. 1.4. Before the amount sent by the trustor reaches
the trustee, it is multiplied by an eciency factor of m > 1 (usually m is set
equal to 3). Therefore, the trustee receives mx. The trustee (usually) has
an initial endowment equal to that of the trustor, and she decides how much
of her total wealth (endowment + mx) to send back to the trustor (trustee's
endowment is set equal to 10 in Fig. 3.3). The amount sent back to the
trustor is denoted y where y 2 [0; 10 + mx]. The continuum of possible y
amounts is represented by the shaded lower part of Fig. 1.4. It should be
noted that the trustee's choice of y is a function of x in the sense y(x).
The wider choice set available to the trustor in the investment game al-
lows for more accurate and rened measurement of trust preferences. For
example, a trustor who assigns a probability p = 0:4 of the trustee recipro-
cating may have chosen the \don't trust" action in Kreps' trust game in Fig.
1.3, but in the investment game, he has the exibility to invest some of the
money in \risky trust" (reecting degrees of trust in the trustee) and keep
the remainder to himself. Amounts x < 3 reect weak trust, x = 5 reects in-
termediate trust, and amounts x > 7 reect strong trust. In case the trustee
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chooses not to reciprocate, the trustor still remains with part of the endow-
ment not sent, and not a devastating zero payo as is the case in Kreps' trust
game. Additionally, the investment game also allows for the measurement of
the strength of the trustee's trustworthiness. For every dollar invested by the
trustor, it is possible to determine what proportion the trustee reciprocates,
and higher proportions reect higher levels of trustworthiness.
To determine the predictions of the money maximizing model for Kreps'
trust game and the investment game, it is wise to simplify the analysis and
look at the structure of the game once the trustor has made his move. If the
trustor chooses the action \don't trust" in Kreps' trust game, then the game
is over and the trustee does not have a move. However, if the trustor chooses
the action \trust," then the game is eectively a dictator game in which the
trustee has the choice of either keeping 14 to herself and allocate nothing to
the trustor, or to allocate 10 to the trustor and reduce her own payo by 4.
Similarly, the trustee in the investment game in Fig. 1.4 is playing a dictator
game in which she chooses how much of her wealth (10 + mx) to allocate
to the trustor. The money maximizing model predicts that the trustee will
keep to herself the payo of 14 in Kreps' trust game in Fig. 3.2, leaving the
trustor with a zero payo since 14 > 10, and the trustee in the investment
game will also keep 10+mx since any y > 0 reduces the trustee's nal payo.
Using the backward induction process, the trustor who is the rst mover in
Kreps' trust game and in the investment game will anticipate this outcome,
and therefore will choose the action \don't trust" in Kreps' trust game and
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will send x = 0 in the investment game. The trustee in the investment game
will also send y = 0 (since the game does not end even if the trustor sends
x = 0). Therefore, the SPEs in Kreps' trust game and the investment game
are given by (don't send ;?), and (send x = 0; send y = 0), respectively.
Trust game experiments with communication
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) modify the trust game (Fig. 1.3) by intro-
ducing a probability p = 1
6
that the trustor gets a zero payo if the trustee
chooses to honor trust.12 In a communication treatment, the trustee is al-
lowed to send a written message to the trustor, and trust behavior in this
treatment is compared to that in the base treatment where no communi-
cation occurs. Charness and Dufwenberg nd that a majority of trustees'
communication includes statements of intent (promises), and observe that
the proportion of trustors who choose to trust their counterparts increases
from 56 percent in the absence of communication to 74 percent when com-
munication is allowed. Overall, there is an increase in the action prole in
which the trustor oers trust and the trustee honors trust from 20 percent in
the no communication treatment to 40 percent in the communication treat-
ment. In a separate communication treatment where trustors send a written
message to trustees prior to the start of play, there is no signicant eect on
12This modication may be seen as representing hidden action in a principal-agent
relationship. Consider an auto-maker in the red that hires a new CEO to transform the
protability of the rm. The success of this human resource acquisition depends on the
strategies that the new CEO implements (i.e., eort that the CEO exerts). However, it
may be the case that despite the CEO exerting maximum eort, an unexpected downturn
in economic activity leads to weak consumer demand, and the rm remains in the red.
60
behavior.
The special contribution of Charness and Dufwenberg is to gure out why
communication from trustees to trustors signicantly enhances trust and co-
operative behavior (trustworthiness), resulting in greater eciency and not
the other way round. Their design allows them to measure the beliefs of par-
ticipants, and they nd that communication potentially inuences motivation
and behavior by inuencing beliefs about beliefs. Specically, since a major-
ity of trustees' communication includes promises, Charness and Dufwenberg
nd evidence consistent with trustees striving to live up to the expectations
of trustors' (induced by their promises) in order to avoid guilt, a hypothesis
they refer to as \guilt aversion".
Following Charness and Dufwenberg, Vanberg (2008) attempts to distin-
guish between \commitment-based" explanations and \expectations-based"
explanations of why communication in the form of promises enhances coop-
erative behavior. In summary, commitment-based explanations contend that
promises aect individuals' behavior because individuals possess a preference
for keeping their word. Expectations-based explanations on the other hand
posit an indirect eect of promises on behavior. Specically, promises alter
second-order beliefs of individuals, and this in turn has an eect on their
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behavior.13 Vanberg's experimental design allows him to directly test these
two explanations. Using essentially the same experimental setup as Char-
ness and Dufwenberg, he achieves this by rst matching trustors and trustees
and allowing the trustees to send messages to trustors, and subsequently re-
matching half of the trustees with dierent trustors before the trustees make
any move. Trustors do not know at any time that trustees have been re-
matched so their rst-order beliefs depend on whether a promise had been
made to them. Rematched trustees on the other hand know of the switch and
are shown the messages that were sent to their new counterparts by a dier-
ent trustee. Most of these messages contain promises, and in principle, the
second-order beliefs of the re-matched trustees should be aected by these
promises. Vanberg nds strong evidence in favor of the commitment-based
explanations observing that an individual's own promise signicantly aects
her behavior towards the person whom the promise is made. In terms of the
expectations-based account, Vanberg nds that promises do induce changes
in second order beliefs, but these changes do not have any signicant eect
on behavior. The general result of Charness and Dufwenberg on the eect of
communication on cooperative behavior is replicated in this experiment.
Goeree and Zhang (2014) introduce competition into Charness and Dufwen-
13Therefore, if I know that individual \X" had been promised something (either by
myself or by someone else), my second order beliefs are altered by the promise. Consider
a situation in which I have to make a decision with regards to whether or not to deliver on
the promise to X. Then, is it just the mere fact that my second order beliefs have been
altered that makes it more likely that I will deliver on the promise, or is there some other
reason? If the answer is in the armative, then who makes the initial promise does not
matter. Vanberg's experiment essentially seeks to answer this question.
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berg's design by including treatments where the trustor can select one of two
trustees prior to playing the trust game. To induce competition in the de-
sign, they oer a higher outside option for the trustee who is selected but
not hired relative to the trustee who is not selected (a payo of 10 relative
to a payo of 5). Goeree and Zhang replicate Charness and Dufwenberg's
result that one way communication from trustees to trustors enhances coop-
erative behavior (the proportion of ecient outcomes rises from 30.1 percent
under no-communication to 64.4 percent with communication). However,
they nd that the introduction of competition signicantly lowers eciency
in the presence of communication, observing a higher proportion of ecient
outcomes under no communication and with competition (53.5 percent) com-
pared to under communication and with competition (37.5 percent). Their
additional result that competition raises eciency in the absence of commu-
nication leads them to conclude that communication and competition act as
substitutes.
Buchan et al. (2006) employ the investment game to study the inu-
ence of communication, culture and social distance on trust and other re-
garding preferences. In an attempt to reconcile contrasting ndings from
Roth (1995) and Dawes et al. (1977) on the inuence of non-strategy re-
lated face-to-face communication on cooperative behavior (where the former
nds a positive inuence and the latter no inuence), they compare the in-
uence of two types of non-strategy related communication on behavior. In
the rst condition (\personal-communication"), participants share personal
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information about themselves but are not allowed to discuss strategies in
the investment game (similar to Roth's restricted treatment). In the sec-
ond condition(\impersonal-communication"), participants discuss facts but
no personal information is shared (similar to the manipulation in Dawes et al.
(1977)). Buchan et al. nd that personal communication results in signi-
cantly higher amounts sent and returned in the investment game (or higher
levels of trust and trustworthiness) relative to impersonal communication.
Therefore, they speculate that what may be relevant in enhancing cooper-
ation, for example as observed in Roth's experiment, may not merely be
non-strategic communication but personal communication, through either
reducing social-distance between communicating parties, increasing group
identity, or promoting other regarding concerns.
1.4 Other games
Apart from dictator, ultimatum, and trust games, the role of communication
has been experimentally studied in public good games, and matrix games
(e.g., prisoners' dilemma, coordination games, and zero-sum games). Since
the focus of this paper is primarily on the rst three games, we will only give
a brief summary of the role of communication in the latter three classes of
games, and refer the reader to other sources where there has been a more
thorough treatment of the literature. In a public goods game, players pri-
vately choose how much of their initial endowment (tokens) to contribute into
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a public pot. The tokens are multiplied by a factor greater than one but less
than N (N representing the total number of players), and this \public good"
payo is evenly divided among players. Each player keeps the part of the
initial endowment that they did not contribute.14 Under a linear voluntary
contribution mechanism, the payo to player j is thus given by
j = p(z   cj) + 
N
 where  =
NX
i=1
ci:
where z represents the total number of tokens, p is the private value of
tokens, cj is the number of tokens that player j contributes,

N
is the marginal
gain from contributing a token. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) of
the public good is simply the marginal rate of substitution between the public
and private good
MPCR =
 @j
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A social dilemma arises when 1
N
< MPCR < 1, and the money maximiz-
ing model predicts that player j will contribute cj = 0.
Coordination games are games with multiple pure strategy Nash equi-
libria where players can choose either the same or corresponding strategies.
They represent abstractions of coordination problems, a classical example be-
14A public good game is therefore just an N -person Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) where con-
tribution by all N players corresponds to the strategy \Cooperate" and non-contribution
corresponds to \Defect". It is protable not to contribute to the public good if everyone
else is contributing just as it is to defect in the one-shot PD.
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ing the \battle of the sexes" { where one player (husband) prefers to watch
a game of football, and the other player (wife) prefers to attend an opera
concert, but both would rather attend the same event together than sepa-
rate events apart. Fig. 1.5 exhibits the payo matrix of the battle of the
sexes game where the wife is the row player and the husband is the column
player. Notice that the game is represented in normal form (payo matrix)
because unlike the ultimatum game and trust game which are sequential-
moves games, coordination games are simultaneous-moves games.15
Figure 1.5: Payo matrix of the battle of the sexes
The two pure strategy Nash equilibria outcomes of the battle of the sexes
game are (opera, opera) and (football, football). The husband prefers the
latter equilibrium but would rather be in the (opera, opera) equilibrium
15Strategically, what is important in the classication of simultaneous-moves versus
sequential-moves games is not the time that an action takes place but the information
available to a player when she makes her move.
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relative to coordination failure. Similarly, the wife prefers the (opera, opera)
equilibrium but would rather be in the (football, football) equilibrium relative
to coordination failure. There is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which
the husband mixes his strategies opera and football with weights (1
3
; 2
3
), and
the wife mixes her strategies opera and football with weights (2
3
; 1
3
). To see
this, suppose that the husband (column player) assigns probability q to the
action \opera" and probability 1   q to the action \football". Then, the
wife's (row player's) expected payo for the action \opera" against (q; 1  q)
is 2(q) + 0(1   q) = 2q. Similarly, the wife's expected payo for the action
\football" against (q; 1   q) is 0(q) + 1(1   q) = 1   q. In particular, if a
mixed strategy constitutes a Nash equilibrium, then all pure strategies in the
mix must yield the same expected payo (or each pure strategy must itself
be a best response). Exploiting this fact, we have to equate the two payos
and solve for q: 2q = 1   q ) q = 1
3
. Since we dened q as the probability
assigned by the husband to the action \opera", 1  1
3
= 2
3
is the probability
he assigns to the action \football" in the mixed Nash equilibrium. Using the
same method, the wife's weights are easily computed. Dierent variants of
coordination games similar in structure to the battle of the sexes are used
in experimental studies of coordination behavior. These experiments often
establish if players coordinate on a particular Nash equilibrium (relative to
another), fail to coordinate, or whether they play the mixed Nash equilibria
of the games.
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Figure 1.6: Prisoners' Dilemma
The Prisoners' Dilemma, the most famous game in game theory, has also
attracted a great deal of interest among experimental economists. In this
game, both the row player and the column player can choose between two
actions: cooperate or defect. If both players choose cooperate, then each
obtains a payo of C 2 R, and if both choose defect, then each obtains a
payo of D 2 R. If a player chooses defect, then she obtains a payo of
A 2 R in the event that the other player chooses cooperate, and the latter
obtains a payo of Z 2 R. The following inequality holds with respect to
the sizes of these payos: A > C > D > Z. Fig. 1.6 exhibits a version of
the prisoners' dilemma where A = 3, C = 2, D = 1, and Z = 0. The game
has one pure strategy Nash equilibrium, i.e., (defect; defect), but no mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium (this can be proved using the procedure we have
previously outlined). A characterizing feature of the game is that the Nash
equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the outcome (cooperate; cooperate). The
money-maximizing model predicts that the Nash equilibrium would result if
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participants play this game in the laboratory, where the payos in the matrix
represent some multiple of real monetary amounts. A famous result, referred
to as the folk theorem, shows that the outcome (cooperate; cooperate) can
emerge as a subgame perfect equilibrium in an innitely repeated version
of the stage game (or where the number of repetitions is unknown by play-
ers). We derive conditions under which (cooperate; cooperate) emerges as a
subgame perfect equilibrium under the assumption that players use an ex-
ponential discount function (the standard case), and in cases where players
use non-exponential discounting (Musau, 2014a).
Figure 1.7: A zero-sum game
Zero-sum games are games in which the gains or losses of a set of players
are exactly balanced by gains and losses of the other players in the game. In
essence, once the payos of all players are added up, then they amount to a
zero sum. Zero-sum games are therefore games of conict, and any result of
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the game is Pareto optimal. Consider the game in Fig. 1.7 which we will refer
to as the \shoot-out" game. In this game, the row player (henceforth striker)
will attempt to score a goal from the penalty spot against the column player
(henceforth goalkeeper). The striker has two strategies: he can either kick
the ball to the left or to the right. The goalkeeper has also two strategies: he
can either dive to the left or to the right. If the striker kicks to the left and
the goal keeper dives to the left, then the spot kick is saved and the striker
gets a payo of  1 whereas the goal keeper gets a payo of 1. However,
if the striker kicks to the left and the goal keeper dives to the right, the
striker scores and gets a payo of 1 whereas the goalkeeper gets a payo of
 1. Thus, if both players pick the same action, this favors the goalkeeper
whereas dierent actions favor the striker. Notice that the payos in each
cell sum up to zero. In zero-sum games, there may be no pure strategy Nash
equilibria as in our shoot-out game. However, there is a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium in which both the striker and goalkeeper mix their strategies
\left" and \right" with weights (1
2
; 1
2
). This can be easily computed using
the procedure described previously. Experiments involving zero-sum games
investigate whether participants follow minimax decision rules when playing
these games.16
16The minimax theorem asserts that in a 2-player zero-sum game, there exists a mixed
strategy and a payo value \V " such that, given player j0s strategy, the best payo possible
that player i can guarantee is V and correspondingly, given player i0s strategy, the best
payo possible that player j can guarantee is  V (i 6= j). In our example, the minimax
strategy involves both the striker and the goalkeeper randomizing their two strategies,
half of the time playing \left" and half of the time playing \right" (the mixed strategy),
yielding V =  V = 0.
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Other game experiments with communication
Brosig et al. (2003) study the eect of communication media on coopera-
tion in standard public goods games. They manipulate two factors: verbal
communication and anonymous interaction. Thus, their seven treatments
include combinations of these factors, for example, no-communication (i.e.
no verbal communication and anonymous interaction), visual identication
with no communication (i.e. no verbal communication but non anonymous
interaction), anonymous communication (verbal communication but anony-
mous interaction), face-to-face communication (verbal communication and
non anonymous interaction). Brosig et al. nd that the lowest contributions
result under both no communication and under visual identication with no
communication with cooperation rates of less than 50 percent. When verbal
communication is introduced but the interaction is non-anonymous, there is
a signicant rise in contributions with cooperation rates of between 50 and
60 percent. The highest contributions are observed when there is face-to-
face communication with cooperation rates in excess of 90 percent. Brosig
et al. conclude that various forms of nonverbal communication such as facial
expression, and body language as well as the tone of voice play a signicant
part in accounting for the observed communication eects.
Isaac and Walker (1988) implement a variant of the four-person volun-
tary contribution mechanism design with MPCR = 0.3. In the experiment,
experienced participants decide on how much to contribute to the public
good and are endowed with identical sums at the start of each period. The
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\NC" treatment involves 10 periods with no communication. The \C/NC"
treatment involves an initial 10 periods with communication followed by 10
periods without communication whereas the \NC/C" treatment involves 10
periods without communication followed by 10 periods with communication.
In the communication periods, participants are allowed to discuss face-to-
face for four minutes about anything, except that they cannot reveal private
information about their endowments and cannot arrange side payments or
issue threats. Thereafter, they return to their terminals and privately make
their contribution decisions. Isaac and Walker nd that communication sig-
nicantly increases mean contributions at levels well above 60 percent in
the communication periods compared to well below 50 percent in the base-
line NC treatment. However, they observe that contributions decline very
slowly in the last half of the C/NC treatment (i.e. periods where there is no
communication), and they also increase slowly in the last half of the NC/C
treatment (periods where there is communication), suggesting that there is a
reinforcing eect, i.e., a history of free-riding tends to discourage cooperation
and a history of cooperation tends to discourage free-riding.
Koukoumelis et al. (2012) consider a voluntary contribution mechanism
with one way communication. In the experiment, groups of four partici-
pants interact for a specied number of periods, where the constitution of
the group does not change across periods. The baseline treatment entails
the standard protocol where there is no communication, and in the com-
munication treatments, one of each group member is randomly selected to
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communicate with the other 3 group members in writing. Each participant is
endowed with a sum of 25 ECU at the start of each period. Koukoumelis et al.
nd that the mean contribution per participant is signicantly higher in the
communication treatments (< 20 ECU) compared to the no communication
treatment (12.27 ECU). Thus, they conclude that in contrast to the usual
explanation that communication enhances cooperation through mutual ex-
change of promises, one-way communication signicantly raises contributions
and lowers their variability. In cases where communication occurs only once,
contribution levels persist in later periods, and the eectiveness of one-way
communication is robust to the absence of strategic concerns.
Bohnet and Frey (1999a) implement the same three treatments described
previously in the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD). They nd that the outcome (Co-
operate, Cooperate) emerges 12 percent of the time in the anonymity con-
dition compared to 23 percent under mutual identication, and 78 percent
under communication. Unlike the dictator game where cooperation rates
were not signicantly dierent between mutual identication and communi-
cation, their results show that face-to-face verbal communication is powerful
in enhancing cooperation in the PD.
A result that seemingly contradicts Roth (1995) on the eect on no-
strategy relevant communication on behavior was found a few decades earlier
in an experiment by Dawes et al. (1977). In this experiment, participants
take part in a 10-minute period where they discuss face-face the percentage
of individuals at certain income levels in a major city of the Pacic Northwest
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region of the U.S. (i.e. participants engage in \fact-related" communication).
As in Roth's experiment, participants cannot discuss strategies in the game.
Dawes et al. nd that fact-related communication results in the same levels
of cooperation as no-communication in social-dilemma games.
A very brief summary on coordination games with communication
One area that deserves a mention in the current thesis is the role of commu-
nication in coordination games. While this area in our opinion has received a
more thorough treatment in the literature, it is important to highlight an area
where costless communication is eective in achieving desirable outcomes.
Much of the work on costless communication (\cheap talk") in coordination
games follows the pioneering work of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In their
sender-receiver model, an informed sender learns her \type" and can convey
this information via cheap talk to a receiver. The receiver after receiving
the sender's message, takes an action which aects the payos of both play-
ers. The model predicts that cheap talk is positively related to eciency the
greater the degree to which interests of players are aligned. Thus, an equilib-
rium exists in which cheap talk is informative. Farrell (1993) subsequently
noted that meaning cannot be established from introspection. This leads
to a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria in a cheap talk game, which
cannot be reduced by any standard equilibrium renement. The reason is
that standard renements need to impose a restriction on the interpretation
of messages that were not expected in equilibrium. One example of an equi-
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librium that always exists in a cheap talk game is the so called \babbling"
equilibrium where cheap talk does not convey any useful information.17
Studies that have looked at the form of communication and outcomes in
coordination games have yielded contrasting results. Ellingsen and Ostling
show that two-sided communication in general results in increased coordina-
tion on equilibrium outcomes and better payos than does one-sided commu-
nication in symmetric 22 games. However, in two-player common interests
games, they observe both one-sided and two-sided communication always fa-
cilitate coordination on the best equilibrium outcome if players make at least
two thinking steps. The duration of communication has also been observed
to be important. Aumann and Hart (2003) show long cheap talk (or long
conversations) convey substantive information that cannot be conveyed by
a single message, and this expands the set of outcomes thus aecting the
equilibria preferred by players. Experimental results that support a number
of these theoretical predictions are covered in Crawford (1998).
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed a substantial body of literature on the eect of
communication in game experiments in economics. Previous ndings have
shown that behavior in game experiments does not conform to predictions
17A babble is a continuous, murmuring sound that is mostly incomprehensible. Thus,
the sender may indeed send a message to the receiver, but if message does not convey any
useful information that helps the receiver to coordinate, it is as if the sender just babbled,
leaving the receiver no wiser.
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of the purely selsh money maximizing model. Subsequent research has
advanced from simply focusing on departures from the standard model to
looking at the incremental eect of structural variables such as communica-
tion on observed behavior. Generally, results show that communication has
a positive eect on increasing donations in dictator games, increasing rates
of cooperation in bargaining games, trust games, and public goods games,
and increasing coordination rates in coordination games when the interests
of players are closely aligned. The general result masks a lot of detail in its
simplicity, and it is tempting to conclude that communication has a unidi-
rectional eect on behavior. In reality, as the experiments that have been
reviewed show, there are a number of varied and at times conicting eects
of communication, some of which need further experimentation in order to
disentangle.
An attempt to delve into the full spectrum of issues raised in the review
would be futile, but here we can motivate how we want to advance the liter-
ature in the proceeding chapters, as well as oer some avenues for future re-
search. One important point that we have raised in the review is the diculty
in achieving a controlled variation of communication if the experimentalist
chooses to focus on face-to-face communication. Therefore, as the pioneering
works of Bohnet and Frey implore, a standard that should be adopted in the
literature is that all face-to-face communication experiments should include
a visual-identication-only treatment. In the ultimatum game, if only visual
identication of the proposer and responder results in behavior not dierent
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to face-to-face communication, then this renders an analysis of the infor-
mational content of messages in the communication treatments redundant.
Therefore, it would be interesting to see a replication of the results by Roth
and Zultan including a visual-identication only treatment.
The vast majority of ultimatum game and trust game studies reviewed
have emphasized the role of strategic communication in achieving higher
levels of cooperation compared to the standard no communication condition.
For example, Charness and Dufwenberg emphasize the eect of rst movers'
promises to cooperate in the trust game, and Andreoni and Rao focus on
the power of asking by recipients in the dictator game. Apart from a few
studies such as Roth (1995), the role of non-strategic communication has not
been analyzed to the same level as strategic communication. Therefore, more
studies that look at the impact of non-strategic communication are needed,
so that one can evaluate a general communication eect as opposed to simply
a strategic communication eect.
An additional consideration is that a number of games feature varying
strategic power dynamics between players, which inevitably aect the na-
ture and content of communication. In the dictator game, for example, the
allocator has full control of the initial endowment, and unilaterally decides
how to split it between herself and the recipient. On the other hand, the re-
cipient initially has nothing and plays no role in determining how the initial
endowment is split. Thus, the inequality in roles implies that all strategic
power is in the hands of the allocator, and one can infer that if given a voice,
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as Andreoni and Rao nd, the recipient is reduced to asking for a portion
of the endowment, or in less kind terms, begging. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no communication study has explored these power dynamics that are
present in sequential move games, and how they aect the ensuing commu-
nication. Given that economic actors have dierent levels of strategic power,
for example in buyer-seller bargaining, exploring how power dynamics aect
communication and cooperation is an important element in understanding
individual behavior.
The proceeding chapters in one way or another attempt to capture one
or several elements of the issues that we raise. In both Chapters 2 and 3,
we change the sequence of communication, so that its eect is non-strategic.
Therefore, unlike the standard pre-play communication sequence, commu-
nication occurs after the rst-mover has made a binding decision, but be-
fore the second-mover has made any decisions. This makes it impossible for
communication in a given period to aect the rst mover's decision in that
period, and this is common knowledge to both the rst- and second-mover.
Additionally, this manipulation allows us not to explicitly constrain the con-
tent of communication as in Roth (1995). We rely on written anonymous
communication in the studies in both chapters to obtain clean data on the
eect of communication, because, as we argue, there may be some identi-
cation based confounds if one chooses face-to-face communication and does
not include a visual-identication-only treatment. Finally, in Chapter 3, we
compare behavior in a symmetric simultaneous move game and a related se-
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quential move game. As we have stated, positional power dierences exist
in sequential move games, but not symmetric simultaneous move games, so
this allows us to investigate the eect of communication on strategic power
dierences.
79

Chapter 2
Anticipated communication in
the ultimatum game
with Marco Capizzani, Luigi Mittone, and Antonino Vaccaro
2.1 Introduction
There is evidence that anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behav-
ior. Xiao and Houser (2009), and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007), nd
that in a dictator game where the allocator donates an amount to a recip-
ient, and the recipient sends an anonymous written message after learning
of the amount, donations are signicantly higher in relation to the standard
(no-communication) condition. In both studies, there is a strong emotional
response by recipients who receive what they perceive to be unfair donations
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(below the 50:50 split), and this is expressed in terms of expressions of dis-
approval, and even at times foul language. For Ellingsen and Johannesson,
individuals are motivated by concerns for pride and blame, whereas Xiao
and Houser argue that allocators in the dictator game have a preference for
avoiding written expression of disapproval, or negative emotions.
One suspects that such motivations persist in similar decision problems
where individuals are required to make allocation decisions. However, in the
extended environment of the ultimatum game, in determining what propor-
tion of endowment to oer, the proposer is not only concerned about her
pro-social behavior, but must factor in the possibility of her oer being re-
jected by the responder. Previous studies have shown that such strategic
considerations have a signicant eect on allocation decisions. Charness and
Gneezy (2008), for example, compare how anonymity and social distance af-
fect behavior in dictator- and ultimatum-games, and nd contrasting eects.
In the dictator game, reducing social distance signicantly increases dona-
tions, whereas in the ultimatum game, there is no signicant eect on oers.
Thus, for them, it appears that strategic considerations crowd out impulses
toward generosity or charity.
In this study, we thus propose to study whether strategic considerations
crowd out anticipatory eects of communication. We achieve this by imple-
menting Xiao and Houser's communication sequence in the ultimatum game
with strategy method. In this setup, the proposer makes a binding proposal
that cannot be subsequently changed. Thereafter, the responder, without
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knowing the actual choice of the proposer, has to indicate for each possible
oer whether she \accepts" or \rejects". We include three treatments. The
base treatment No Communication (henceforth NC) is the standard condi-
tion where participants are anonymous and are not allowed to communicate,
with a three minute time-gap between choices of the proposer and responder.
The two communication treatments One-Sided Communication (henceforth
OSC), and Two-Sided Communication (henceforth TSC), consist of a three
minute communication phase in between the proposer and responder choices.
The treatments dier only in terms of how we manipulate communication: In
the OSC treatment, the proposer unilaterally communicates to the responder
in writing, whereas in the TSC treatment, both the proposer and responder
communicate with each other in writing.
In a related paper, Xiao and Houser (2005) allow responders in the stan-
dard ultimatum game to attach a written message to their \accept" or \re-
ject" decision, after learning of the oer from the proposer. They nd that
proposer oers do not dier compared to the standard condition, but re-
sponders reject unfair oers signicantly less frequently. One fundamental
dierence between our designs is that the proposer's oer focalizes the com-
munication content in Xiao and Houser's study, whereas in our study, the
responder has an uninformative prior. As Xiao and Houser infer, responders'
expression of negative emotions for what they perceive to be unfair oers
decreases the likelihood that they reject such oers, and thus it appears that
communication supplements costly punishment (by providing an additional
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medium where an aggrieved responder can express her negative emotions).
Our study allows communication in the form of expressions of negative emo-
tions, such as may occur if a proposer reveals that she oered an amount
perceived to be unfair by the responder, in the two-sided communication
condition. However, such communication is neither exclusive nor even ex-
pected to be signicant in quantity. Therefore, since oers are never revealed
prior to the conclusion of play, our design allows us to examine the eect of
anticipated communication that is not constrained in some predened way.
Furthermore, the strategy method (Selten, 1967) allows us to elicit the
full strategy vector of the responder. In the ultimatum game, little is known
about responder choices corresponding to especially high oers since such of-
fers are rarely observed in practice, and previous studies have mostly elicited
responses using the direct-response method. Considering a sample of 75 stan-
dard ultimatum game experiments, Oosterbeek et al. (2004) nd that less
than a fth elicited responses using the strategy method. As Zultan (2012,
p. 18) observes, \... [responder behavior in ultimatum games] has received
relatively little attention in previous studies, when compared to proposer be-
havior, possibly because `The recipients' action[s],... are easier to interpret'
(Thaler, 1988, p. 197)". Empirically, Brandts and Charness (2011) conclude
that both the strategy- and the direct response-method generally yield sim-
ilar results, thus consistent with the standard theoretical view. In addition,
from the view-point of a single study, given that an experimentalist applies
the same method consistently across treatments, any existential dierences
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between the methods would not invalidate conclusions from that particular
study.1
The content of the communication is not restricted in OSC and TSC,
but because identiability may introduce nonpecuniary inuences on prefer-
ences, participants are not allowed to divulge information in the messages
that can lead to them being identied. In contrast to the result of Xiao and
Houser (2005), we nd that anticipated communication eects still persist
in the presence of strategic considerations with two-sided communication,
with oers in TSC being signicantly higher to either OSC or NC. Oers in
NC and OSC do not dier, suggesting that anticipation eects also crucially
depend on the form of communication. In terms of responder behavior, we
observe a signicant amount of non-monotonicity in responder choices across
all three treatments, with higher conditional rejection frequencies for high
(above equal-split) and low (below equal-split) oers in TSC, relative to ei-
ther OSC or NC. However, as was the case for oers, responder rejection
rates do not dier between NC and OSC. An analysis of the informational
content of communication in OSC and TSC reveals that the vast majority of
participants communication are statements or discussions of the ultimatum
game being played (such as references to \oer", \accept", \reject"). In ad-
dition, we nd evidence that proposers restrict the content of communication
to conversations that exclude references to fairness in OSC, when they uni-
1In experiments where methods yield dierent results, one can distinguish between
\hot" eects and \cold" eects. However, the responsibility rests on the experimentalist
to explain if and how such observed dierences matter.
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laterally communicate to responders, which may account for why we observe
behavioral dierences in TSC relative to either OSC or NC, but not in OSC
relative to NC.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2.1 presents our experimen-
tal design. Section 2.2.2 outlines our behavioral predictions. Section 2.2.3
describes the experimental procedures and protocols. Section 2.3 presents
the results of the experiment, and provides an analysis of the informational
content of messages in OSC and TSC. Eventually, Sect. 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Method
2.2.1 Experimental Design
We investigate behavior in the ultimatum game with strategy method. In
our setting, the proposer (henceforth X) chooses an amount x to oer to
the responder (henceforth Y ) from a pie of 10 Euros, with the restriction
that each player gets at least 1 Euro. This results in nine possible oers:
x 2 f1; 2; :::; 9g. In turn, Y , without knowing the actual choice ofX, indicates
for each possible oer whether she accepts or rejects. We denote Y 's choice
yx 2 faccept; rejectg. A strategy of Y assigns yx to each x choice of X, and
is a 9-element vector collected by having Y ll in a table similar to Table 2.1,
with either \accept" or \reject" at each blank box.
An outcome of the game is a matched pair (x; yx) with the following
payos:
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Table 2.1: Ultimatum game with strategy method: Y 's decision task
x 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
yx         
X =
8><>: (10  x) Euros if yx = accept0 Euros if yx = reject (2.1)
Y =
8><>: x Euros if yx = accept0 Euros if yx = reject (2.2)
where X and Y denote the payos to X and Y respectively.
Before Y makes her choices, but afterX has chosen a binding oer x, there
is a three minute communication phase in each of the game experiments. We
distinguish three treatments:
1. NC (No Communication): Standard anonymous no-communication
condition with a time gap during the communication phase.
2. OSC (One-Sided Communication): X has the option to anony-
mously and unilaterally communicate in writing with Y during the
communication phase.
3. TSC (Two-Sided Communication): BothX and Y have the option
to anonymously communicate with each other in writing during the
communication phase.
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2.2.2 Behavioral Predictions
Previous ultimatum game experiments have shown that even in the absence of
communication, proposers on average oer about 40 percent of stakes on oer,
and responders frequently reject oers of less than 20 percent, independent
of the size of initial endowment (refer to the meta analysis by Oosterbeek
et al.). Therefore, based on these studies, we predict the following for the
NC treatment:
H1 X participants will make positive oers, on average in excess of 30 per-
cent of endowment.
H2 Y participants will both frequently reject oers of less than 20 percent of
endowment, and will accept oers in excess of 30 percent of endowment.
A few ultimatum bargaining experiments have examined the eect of
communication on bargaining outcomes, and have for the most part found
that communication induces more egalitarian oers, and lower rates of dis-
agreement between bargaining parties (see, for example, Roth, 1995; Zultan,
2012). However, apart from Xiao and Houser (2005), none has examined the
eect of anticipated communication on proposer behavior, or provided a de-
tailed analysis of responder choices when communication proceeds the oer.
Nevertheless, these studies alongside the dictator game studies of Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2007), and Xiao and Houser (2009), provide us with some
insights on expected behavior in our experiment.
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Xiao and Houser (2005) does not nd an anticipated communication eect
(present in the two dictator game studies), suggesting that strategic consid-
erations crowd out such anticipated communication eects in the standard
ultimatum game. However, our design allows for a stronger eect to be
observed in TSC, since two-sided communication implies that the proposer
plays an active role (participates) in the communication, as opposed to where
the proposer is passive and simply receives the accept/reject decision, along
with a written message from the responder. Participation of the proposer
implies that the responder can ask directly about how much the proposer of-
fered, and subsequently the proposer may incur the wrath of the responder if
the oer is judged to be unfair. On the other hand, the proposer may choose
to lie about the oer to avoid any emotional backlash from the responder,
but the proposer may feel guilty about lying later on. Therefore, due to
guilt aversion, the proposer may simply choose to be more other-regarding.
Therefore, we expect the fact that the proposer is active in TSC will result
in an anticipated communication eect.
H3 X participants will make higher oers in TSC relative to either NC or
OSC.
It is clear from the dictator game studies of Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2007), and Xiao and Houser (2009), that the crucial aspect is the feedback
mechanism of (anticipated) communication. Since it is the proposer that
makes the oer, we do not expect that she will increase or decrease her oers
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if she unilaterally communicates, but does not expect feedback of any form.
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), for example, argue that communication
in the form of promises from second movers in the trust game is what is
crucial in inducing rst movers to cooperate. They observe that one-sided
written communication from rst movers has no eect on cooperation lev-
els, in comparison to the no communication condition. Similarly, Andreoni
and Rao (2011), in the dictator game, nd that the amount allocated is
lowest in the standard no communication condition, and when the allocator
communicates unilaterally to the recipient in writing, compared to all other
conditions (one-sided communication from the recipient, and two-sided com-
munication). Therefore, we expect that one-sided communication from the
proposer will have no eect on oers, or responder choices, compared to no
communication.
H4 Oers of X participants will not dier between OSC and NC.
H5 Choices of Y participants will not dier between OSC and NC.
Finally, Xiao and Houser (2005) note that communication supplements
costly punishment in the standard ultimatum game, with responders being
less likely to reject what they perceive to be unfair oers from proposers if
they can show their disdain for the oers in the form of written messages.
However, we note that since our design does not allow for the responder to
denitively learn of the proposer's oer prior to the conclusion of the one-
shot ultimatum game, it is not clear that the content in Xiao and Houser's
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study will be the same as that in our study. In a face-to-face communication
treatment of an ultimatum game with strategy method similar to ours, Zul-
tan (2012) observes that responders act less cooperatively when communica-
tion is unrestricted, compared to the standard no-communication condition,
whereas restricting communication to social conversations results in respon-
der behavior not dierent to the standard condition. Therefore, since we
impose no restrictions on the content of communication in TSC, it is highly
likely that behavior will be similar to Zultan's unrestricted communication
result.
H6 Rejection frequencies will be signicantly higher in TSC relative to either
NC or OSC.
2.2.3 Participants and Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Cognitive and Experimental Economics
Laboratory (CEEL) at the University of Trento. A total of 120 participants
took part in six experimental sessions compromising two sessions per treat-
ment. The participants were recruited from the undergraduate populations
at the University. None of the participants had previously taken part in this
series of experiments.
On their arrival, participants were allocated separate computer terminals,
and given a copy of the instructions for the experiment. Time was allocated
for private reading of these instructions. Thereafter, a member of the exper-
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imental sta read aloud the instructions in an attempt to make the rules and
procedures of the experiment common knowledge.
Each participant was then randomly assigned either the role X or Y ,
and maintained that role for the remainder of the experiment. To ensure
comprehension with the instructions, participants had to answer a set of
control questions relating to the contents of the instructions prior to the
actual start of the experiment.
The experiment consisted of ve periods. At the start of each period,
each participant with the role X was randomly paired with a participant
with the role Y . No participant was paired with the same participant at a
subsequent period, and this detail of the matching protocol was explicit in
the instructions.
In the communication treatments, a member of the experimental sta
monitored the contents of the messages to make sure that they complied
with the instructions. Participants in these treatments were explicitly made
aware of this fact prior to the actual start of the experiment.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Choices of X
We begin with a summary of the choices of X participants across the three
treatments. Figure 2.1 exhibits the distribution of individual-level average
oers over the ve periods of the experiment.
Most oers are between 40 50 percent of endowment in TSC, and 30 40
percent of endowment in NC and OSC. Both the rst-period- and overall-
mean-oer across periods are higher in TSC compared to either NC or OSC.
A series of Mann-Whitney U tests on period averages shows that oers dier
between NC and TSC ( = :010), and OSC and TSC ( < :001). However,
the tests do not reveal a statistically signicant dierence between oers in
NC and OSC.
Observation 1 Behavior of X participants in NC and OSC does not dier.
However, oers are signicantly higher in TSC.
These results are consistent with our behavioral hypotheses H1, H3, and
H4, and show that anticipated two-sided communication induces higher oers
from proposers. Whether two-sided communication results in higher levels of
cooperation, generally, depends on the behavior of Y participants analyzed
below.
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Figure 2.1: Choices of X (average at the individual level)
Choices of Y
Figure 2.2 exhibits a grouped bar plot of conditional acceptance rates of Y
participants across the three experimental treatments.
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Figure 2.2: Conditional choices of Y (comparison across treatments)
What is immediately apparent from the bar plots is the non-monotonicity
of Y choices across all treatments. A monotonic strategy of Y requires that if
yx = \accept", then yx0 = \accept" for all x
0 > x. Therefore, for example, if
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a participant accepts an oer x = 5, to adhere to monotonicity, she must also
accept all oers x > 5. In addition, the bar plots reveal that acceptance rates
are consistently lowest in TSC. For low oers, i.e., x 2 [1; 3], Mann Whitney
U-tests on period averages show that acceptance rates dier between TSC
and NC ( = :003), and TSC and OSC ( = :007). However, the tests do
not reveal a dierence in acceptance rates between NC and OSC ( = :767).
Across all treatments, acceptance rates are highest for intermediate oers,
i.e., x 2 [4; 6]. The maximum acceptance rate is observed at the equal split of
the pie, x = 5, with nearly all such oers accepted by Y participants. For this
range of oers, MannWhitney U-tests do not highlight a signicant dierence
in acceptance rates between treatments. For high oers, i.e., x 2 [7; 9],
acceptance rates dier only between NC and TSC ( = :024).
Observation 2 Y participants are signicantly less cooperative in TSC if
oers are either low or high. For intermediate oers, there are no behavioral
dierences between treatments.
Hypothesis H2 is not fully supported due to the non-monotonicity of a
large number of participant Y strategy vectors. Even though we observe that
Y participants frequently reject oers of less than 20 percent of endowment,
the frequency of rejection of high oers is also high (relative to the expecta-
tion that no high oer is rejected). In NC, for example, 10 percent responder
choices corresponding to the maximum oer of x = 9 were \reject", which
is signicantly dierent to the case where all choices are \accept" (Wilcoxon
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signed-rank test,  = 0:020). Hypothesis H5 is supported, and hypothesis H6
holds with the qualication that rejection rates do not dier between OSC
and TSC for the range of high oers.
2.3.2 Regression Analysis
We specify regression and probability models in this section in order to gain
an in-depth analysis of choices of X, and rejection behavior of Y . The
models take into account dependencies that arise from the matching protocol
implemented, and repeated play across periods.
Analysis of Proposer behavior
To analyze choices of X, we specify a random eects linear model. The
dependent variable oer represents the Euro value of the oer made by
participant i, and takes on values in the range [1,9]. The model takes the
form:
oer i = 0 + 1OSCi + 2TSCi + 3periodi + ui
where as explanatory variables, we include indicator variables for the OSC
and TSC treatments, and a period variable. In addition, as a robustness
check, we estimate two random eects probit models where the dependent
variable oer takes on the value one if x = 5, and 4  x  6, respectively,
and equals zero otherwise. The baseline treatment in the regression analysis
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is NC. Table 2.2 summarizes the results of the regressions.2
Table 2.2: Choices of X (Random Eects: linear and probit)
Coe (Std. Err.)
Oer All (x 2 [1; 9]) x = 5 4  x  6
(Intercept) 3.775 (0.236) -0.476 (0.262) 0.332 (0.239)
OSC -0.210 (0.189) -0.417 (0.206) -0.260 (0.188)
TSC 0.550 (0.189) 0.443 (0.192) 0.434 (0.192)
Period -0.062 (0.054) -0.002 (0.057) -0.023 (0.055)
W -st1 16.250 17.300 13.010
No. of observations (groups) 300 (20) 300 (20) 300 (20)
Random intercept of Level{2} 0.479 0.629 0.493
W -st1 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis that OSC= TSC
}Experimental participants
(0:01); (0:05); (0:1); signicance level
The results show that across all specications, anticipated two-sided com-
munication has a positive and signicant eect on participant X oers rel-
ative to either no communication or one-sided communication (see W   st1
statistics). In general, anticipated one-sided communication has no eect on
X oers relative to no communication, but signicantly decreases the likeli-
hood that participant X splits the endowment fty fty. Experience has no
eect on participant X oers.
Observation 3 X participants oer more if they anticipate two-sided com-
munication. Anticipated one-sided communication generally has no eect
2The random eects linear model is estimated using the two-stage FGLS estimator
(Balestra and Nerlove, 1966), and the random eects probit models are estimated using
maximum likelihood.
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on X oers, but decreases the probability that X will split the endowment
equally.
Analysis of Responder behavior
To analyze the rejection behavior of Y , we specify a multilevel logit model.
The dependent variable reject takes the value one if Y rejects an oer of
X, and equals zero if she accepts. To account for the non-monotonicity of
a signicant proportion of participant Y strategies, we include in our set of
explanatory variables dummies for the possible oer levels of X (x LOW
for x 2 [1; 3], and x HIGH for x 2 [7; 9]).3 Other explanatory variables as
previously dened are OSC, TSC, and Period. The baseline oer level in the
regression analysis is x INT where x 2 [4; 6], and the baseline treatment is
NC. The logit model takes the form:
pi = prob(rejecti = 1) = f(0 + 
0Xi)
where
0Xi = 1OSCi + 2TSCi + 3x LOWi + 4x HIGHi + 5Periodi:
The model is estimated with GLLAMM (Stata), and we allow error terms
to be correlated within sessions. Table 2.3 summarizes the results of the
regressions.
3A feasible estimation approach with monotonic strategy-vectors is to dene a minimum
acceptance threshold for a responder, i.e., the minimum amount that the responder is
willing to accept, and then analyze how it changes across treatments (see, for example,
Zultan 2012).
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Table 2.3: Analysis of Responder Choices (GLLAMM: logit)
Coe (Std. Err.)
reject  (1) (2)
(Intercept) -3.640 (0.744) -3.496 (0.382)
OSC 0.646 (0.917) 0.345 (0.290)
TSC 0.944 (0.888) 0.851 (0.289)
x LOW 1.344 (0.740)  1.386 (0.320)
x HIGH 3.487 (0.722) 3.283 (0.315)
Period -0.088 (0.034) -0.088 (0.034)
OSC*x LOW -0.075 (0.913)
OSC*x HIGH -0.385 (0.891)
TSC*x LOW 0.155 (0.880)
TSC*x HIGH -0.189 (0.862)
W -st1 0.16 3.11
W -st2 96.04 318.35
No. of observations (sessions) 2700 (6) 2700 (6)
Log-likelihood -1301.80 -1302.77
Random eects variance} 0.067 0.069
W -st1 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis that OSC= TSC
W -st1 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis that x LOW= x HIGH
}Sessions
(0:01); (0:05); (0:1); signicance level
Beginning from a very general model in column (1) of the table, we elim-
inate insignicant interactions until we are left with the desired model in
column (2). The results show that two-sided communication has a signicant
eect in increasing the likelihood that Y rejects an oer relative to either no
communication or one-sided communication (see W  St1 statistic), whereas
one-sided communication has no eect on the rejection behavior of Y relative
to no communication. The non-monotonicity of Y choices exhibited in Fig-
ure 2.2 is conrmed by the probability model, where it emerges that either
low- or high-oers of X increase the likelihood of rejection by Y participants,
relative to intermediate oers. In addition, low oers signicantly increase
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the likelihood of rejection relative to high oers (see W  st2 statistic), while
rejection rates decline across periods.
Observation 4 Y participants are more likely to reject X oers with two-
sided communication, whereas one-sided communication has no eect on the
rejection behavior of Y .
Observation 5 Unequal oers (both high and low) are more likely to be
rejected by Y participants, whereas experience makes it less likely that an
oer is rejected.
2.3.3 Analysis of the informational content of messages
In the behavioral predictions section, following the anticipated communica-
tion results of Ellingsen and Johannesson, and Xiao and Houser, as well as
the communication studies of Andreoni and Rao in the dictator game, and
Charness and Dufwenberg in the trust game, we correctly predicted that one
sided communication will have no eect on behavior of proposers in our ex-
periment. We argued that from these studies, what appears to be of crucial
importance is the feedback mechanism of communication, which can only
occur if the responder is active in the communication. However, our experi-
mental design diers from those implemented in previous studies in the sense
that communication occurs after the proposer has committed to a binding
oer, whereas the responder never denitively learns about the oer until
the end of the game. Therefore, there is no way to determine a priori what
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the content of communication will be. We therefore implement a qualitative
analysis of the informational content of communication in OSC and TSC, to
see if we can spot dierences in the content of communication between the
treatments, which may in turn explain observed behavioral dierences.
Our analysis strategy is to identify communication-content classications
that have previously been identied as having an eect on observed behav-
ior in experiments. Roth (1995), and subsequently Zultan (2012), identi-
ed dierences in responder behavior between game-related communication,
and non-game-related communication (social conversations) in the ultima-
tum game.4 Such a classication is feasible in our experiment because even
though the content of communication in OSC and TSC are unrestricted ex-
ante, proposers in OSC may choose to restrict content to non-game-related
conversations since they unilaterally communicate with responders.
We categorize the content of communication as either game-related or
non-game-related. Specically, we dene game-related communication as
any communication that includes reference to a parameter in the ultimatum
game, such as, oer, accept, reject, payo, and earning. Non-game-related
communication on the other hand is any communication that does not fall
into the dened category. We add a third category, No communication, since
participants in both treatments are given the option of not engaging in com-
4Recall that Zultan (2012) nds that responders behave less cooperatively under game-
related communication. Therefore, the preliminary hypothesis is that the there is a sig-
nicantly higher percentage of conversations that exclude game-related content in OSC
relative to TSC.
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munication if they so wish. The categorization was conducted using Stata,
and Appendix 2.5.2 presents details of the procedure.
In total, there were twenty proposers in OSC, and twenty proposer-
responder pairs in TSC, communicating over ve periods resulting in a poten-
tial total of one hundred conversations per treatment. Figure 2.3 summarizes
the breakdown of the conversations by content for the treatments.
Figure 2.3: Communication breakdown by content
84=100 conversations in OSC relative to 77=100 in TSC included game-
related content. Only 9=100 conversations were classied as non-game-related
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in OSC, relative to 7=100 in TSC.
Observation 6 The vast majority of proposer and proposer-responder pair
conversations is game-related.
Since there is no signicant dierence in the proportion of game-related
communication across treatments, we further rene the game-related cat-
egory and consider the proportion of conversations in which the proposer
explicitly stated the oer amount. In OSC, there was an explicit statement
of the amount in 49=93 cases, relative to 49=84 cases in TSC. Out of this,
2/49 cases in OSC involved deception, compared to 1/49 in TSC, implying
that most proposers who stated their oer amount were being truthful. The
percentage dierences in the number of conversations falling into either sub-
category is not signicant to explain dierences in responder choices in OSC
relative to TSC. In addition, we cannot attribute the dierences to deception
on the part of proposers.
An alternative classication
The previous categorization does not explain dierences in behavior across
our communication treatments, and therefore, it is likely that an alternative
process is in eect. As in many instances involving social preferences, Fehr
and Schmidt's inequality aversion model is robust in explaining behavior
across a wide range of games. Following this theory, we test the degree to
which communication included notions of fairness across treatments, thus
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potentially explaining the presence of higher oers and higher disagreement
frequencies in TSC relative to OSC.
Our hypothesis is that there were more fairness-oriented conversations in
TSC relative to OSC. With more notions of fairness prominent, responders
have an induced expectation of fairness, and if this expectation is not met,
then they are more willing to punish proposers, compared to absent the
expectation. Concurrently, proposers anticipate responders' expectations,
and respond positively to these expectations (the feedback mechanism).
To test whether there is evidence in support of the hypothesis, we analyze
the content of messages in the communication treatments, focusing on the
whether it included any fairness-oriented language. Therefore, we categorize
a message as fairness-oriented if it includes a term referencing fairness such as
fair, equal, equitable, even, half, fty-fty, same, and identical.5 Otherwise,
we categorize the message as non-fairness oriented. As with the previous case,
the categorization was conducted using Stata, and Appendix 2.5.2 presents
details of the procedure.
Figure 2.4 exhibits the distribution of messages that fall into our dened
categories. In total, 32=100 conversations in OSC included fairness-oriented
content relative to 53=100 in TSC. The mean oer for this category in OSC
5As a disclaimer, we acknowledge that equal is not necessarily fair. However, for most
participants in the ultimatum game, there is a high positive correlation between the two
concepts.
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Figure 2.4: Fairness-oriented vs. Non-fairness-oriented content
and TSC was, respectively, 4.19 and 4.39. Conversely, 61=100 conver-
sations in OSC, relative to 31=100 in TSC included non-fairness oriented
content. The mean oer for this category in OSC and TSC was, respectively,
2.90 and 3.55.
Observation 7 A signicantly higher proportion of conversations in TSC
includes fairness-oriented content. In both OSC and TSC, mean oers are
signicantly higher when the content of communication is fairness-oriented.
When the content of communication is fairness-oriented, there is no sig-
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nicant dierence in the amounts oered in OSC and TSC, but there is a
signicant dierence in the relative frequency of such conversations between
the treatments. One, however, has to exercise caution when reading this
result as it relates to OSC. It is possible that causality runs from oer to
communication, in the sense that proposers who oer higher amounts, and
unilaterally communicate to responders, are more likely to engage in fairness-
oriented conversations. However, what is not in doubt is that there is a clear
anticipation eect of communication in TSC. The inclusion of responders into
the conversation in TSC results in a signicantly larger number of fairness
oriented conversations in comparison to OSC, and proposers appear to an-
ticipate such conversations, oering higher amounts on average, compared to
OSC. The result provides support for the view that communication in unre-
stricted bargaining enhances cooperation by focusing participants' attention
on a small number of fairness norms.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated whether the anticipated communication result
of Xiao and Houser (2009), and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007), is robust
to the presence of strategic considerations. In these studies, it is observed
that donations in the dictator game are signicantly higher in relation to
the standard (no-communication) condition when the allocator knows that
she will receive feedback in the form of an anonymous written message from
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the recipient. We show that such anticipation eects still persist in the ulti-
matum game if communication is two-sided. Thus, even though one might
imagine that the proposer in the ultimatum game mainly focuses on whether
the responder will accept or reject her oer, it is also apparent that if the
proposer knows that she will have to interact with the responder by exchang-
ing anonymous written messages, then this additionally aects her allocation
behavior. In other words, strategic considerations do not fully crowd out the
anticipated communication eect.
Eliciting choices using the strategy method allowed us to study responder
behavior at oer levels that are rarely observed in the actual course of play.
Interestingly, this revealed a great deal of non-monotonicity in responder
choices both in the presence, and absence of communication. Inequality
aversion models such as that of Fehr and Schmidt implicitly assume that
individuals suer a psychological cost if they are either better o or worse
o than other individuals (i.e., they dislike inequality). We provide evidence
that a signicant number of responders are willing to sacrice their own
material payo to avoid inequality, even if this inequality is in their favor.
One-sided communication from the proposer does not result in behav-
ior that diers with no communication, a result that mirrors Andreoni and
Rao's result of one-sided communication from allocators to recipients in the
dictator game. By analyzing the informational content of communication in
our experiment, we observe that proposers restrict the content of communi-
cation to non-fairness oriented content when they unilaterally communicate
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with responders. This behavior can seemingly be explained by guilt aversion.
Knowing that they have oered lower amounts (relative to the equal split),
proposers want to avoid conversations that remind them of fairness, since
such conversations may trigger a guilty conscience within them.
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Instructions (Translation from Italian)
[text corresponding to OSC treatment is shown in square brackets]
ftext corresponding to TSC treatment is shown in bracesg
Thank you for taking the time to attend this session. If you have any
question at any point before, during or at the end of the experiment, please
raise your hand and one of the experimenters will assist you. You are not
allowed to talk to anyone else in the room except for the experimenters.
You will receive a show-up fee of e2.50 for taking part in this session. In
addition, you have the opportunity to earn more money depending on the
decisions that you and others make during the session. At the end of the
session, you will personally be paid the total sum of your show-up fee and
earnings in private.
The experiment will take place on a computer where you will be paired
with a dierent individual at each period. There will be a total of ve
periods. At no point during or after the experiment will any individual know
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the identities of individuals that he or she is paired with across the periods.
Decision Tasks
At the very beginning, the computer will randomly assign you either the role
of X or Y . Once this assignment is complete, you will remain in that role
for the remainder of the session. If you are assigned the role of X, you will
be paired with an individual assigned the role of Y and vice-versa. Your
earnings will depend on the decisions that you make in your pair.
On the computer screen, each individualX will select one of nine divisions
of e10. These divisions are (e1, e9), (e2, e8), (e3, e7), (e4, e6), (e5,
e5), (e6, e4), (e7, e3), (e8, e2), (e9, e1), where the Euro amounts within
the parenthesis represent (Amount to X, Amount to Y ) respectively.
Not knowing the choice of X, for each of the nine divisions, Y has to
indicate whether he or she accepts or rejects. If Y accepts, then X and Y
both receive the amounts as per the division. If Y rejects, then both X and
Y receive e0. Note that there will be a three minute time-gap between the
choice of X, which temporally comes rst, and Y 's decision.
[A message
X has the option of sending a message(s) to Y prior to Y choosing whether
to accept or reject the oers corresponding to each division. However, the
message(s) will be after X has chosen one of the nine divisions. The following
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sequence illustrates the chronology of events:
X's choice! optional message(s) from X to Y ! Y 's decision
There will be a message window on the computer screen where X can
write a message(s) to Y within the three minute time-gap between X's choice
and Y 's decision. If X does not intend to send a message(s) to Y , then he or
she can click on the button labeled \no message" at the bottom right hand
corner of the screen. If this happens, then Y will be notied that X has
chosen not to send any message(s). At any point within the allotted three
minutes, X can send a message(s) to Y regardless of whether he or she had
earlier opted not to.
In the message(s), X is not allowed to identify him or herself. Therefore,
he or she cannot include personal details such as name, gender, appearance,
age, address, phone number, and program or year of study. (Experimenters
will monitor the message(s). Violations (to the discretion of the experi-
menters) will result in X forfeiting the e2.50 show-up fee and leaving the
session with no earnings. The paired Y will receive the average amount re-
ceived by other Y 's.) Apart from these restrictions, X may say anything
that he or she wishes in the message(s).
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fMessages
Both X and Y have the option of sending messages to each other prior to Y
choosing whether to accept or reject the oers corresponding to each division.
However, the messages will be after X has chosen one of the nine divisions.
The following sequence illustrates the chronology of events:
X's choice! optional messages between X and Y ! Y 's decision
There will be a message window on the computer screen and both X
and Y can send messages to each other within the three minute time-gap
between X's choice and Y 's decision. If either X or Y does not intend to
send a message(s) to the other, then he or she can click on the button labeled
\no message" at the bottom right hand corner of the screen. If this happens,
then the paired participant will be notied that either X or Y has chosen
not to send any message and subsequently, he or she will decide whether
to send a message(s) to him or her. At any point within the allotted three
minutes, X and Y can send a message(s) to the paired participant regardless
of whether they had earlier opted not to.
In the messages, both X and Y are not allowed to identify themselves.
Therefore, they cannot include personal details such as name, gender, ap-
pearance, age, address, phone number, and program or year of study. (Ex-
perimenters will monitor the messages. Violations (to the discretion of the
112
experimenters) will result in the violator forfeiting the e2.50 show-up fee and
leaving the session with no earnings. The paired individual will receive the
average amount received by other participants.) Apart from these restric-
tions, both X and Y may say anything that they wish in the messages.
Earnings
Out of the ve periods, one period will be randomly selected for payment.
Total earnings at the end of the experiment for both X and Y will be the
sum of the show-up fee and earnings in the period that is randomly selected.
2.5.2 Categorization procedure
All statistical analysis and categorization of messages in this paper was con-
ducted using Stata. Included in each observation, which is a row in Stata, was
a string variable of maximum length 244 characters (Stata type str244), which
contained the entire message of the proposer in OSC, and proposer-responder
pair in TSC in a given period. All punctuation marks were removed from
the messages prior to the creation of the variable, and all characters were
converted into lower-case. In the instances where a participant(s) chose not
to engage in communication, the variable had the entry \NO MESSAGE".
For the rst category, we identied a list of key words that reference a
parameter in the ultimatum game, including ultimatum, game, oer, accept,
reject, payo, euro, currency, period, earnings (and dierent combinations of
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these: in Italian), as well as numbers representing monetary amounts.
Following identication of key words, we used the -inlist- command in
Stata to generate an indicator variable that took the value one if a message
included game-related content, and zero otherwise. However, prior to this, a
loop was used to separate the message variable into constituent word variables
using Stata's string function -word-, so that the software could handle the
length of messages.
For the sake of illustration, we translate three messages from the list of
messages in TSC and OSC, and explain the procedure.
Example message from TSC:
X I decided to oer you 6 leaving me with 4.
Y You did not split half-half?
X No I chose a little less for myself.
This message exchange is entered into Stata as follows:
\i decided to oer you six leaving me with four you did not split half half
no i chose a little bit less for myself"
Example message from OSC:
X Hello, it's hot outside today... isn't it?
This message is entered into Stata as follows:
\hello it is hot outside today is it not"
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Example message from OSC or TSC:
X or X-Y pair [No communication occurred]
This message is entered into Stata as follows:
\NO MESSAGE"
The commands below enter the data above into Stata, and separate the
message variable into constituent word variables using a loop (note that here
we generate a maximum of 25 word variables because the longest message
has 25 words):
input str244 message
"i decided to offer you six leaving me with four you did not split
half half no i chose a little bit less for myself"
"hello it is hot outside today is it not"
"NO MESSAGE"
end
forvalues i = 1(1)25 f
gen word`i'=word( message, `i')
g
Finally, we use another loop to identify the occurrence of our dened
keywords in the messages. A version of the following (expanded to include
all combinations of words, e.g., accepts, accepted, etc.) generate an indicator
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variable which we label \game related" that tells us how many conversations
included our dened keywords.
forvalues i = 1(1)25 f
gen game r`i' = inlist(word`i', "ultimatum", "offer", "accept", "reject",
"payoff", "euro", "currency", "earn")
g
egen game related= rowtotal( game r1 - game r25)
replace game related=1 if game related>1
list message game related
The resulting Stata output is as shown below. It is clear from the mes-
sages that only the rst one has a game related content.
Figure 2.5: Stata Output
116
For the second category, we included all synonyms of the word \fair"
that we could identify as keywords, including, reasonable, equal, half, and
generous. The ensuing categorization followed the above description.
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Chapter 3
Communication, sequentiality
and strategic power: A
prisoners' dilemma experiment
with Luigi Mittone
3.1 Introduction
In two-player sequential game experiments, there is usually an asymmetry
in the observed payos of players. For example, the average distribution of
stakes on oer favors rst-movers in the ultimatum game (see, for example,
Guth et al., 1982; Cameron, 1999; Henrich, 2000; Andersen et al., 2011). A
meta-analysis of over 30 standard ultimatum game experiments shows that
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the average rst-mover oer to the second-mover is 40 percent of the pie, and
this share is even smaller for larger pie-sizes. Concurrently, second-movers
only frequently reject oers of less than 20 percent, independent of the size of
the pie (Oosterbeek et al., 2004). In the investment game, on the other hand,
the picture is reversed and the distribution of nal payos favors second-
movers (refer to Berg et al., 1995; Willinger et al., 2003; Buchan et al., 2008).
Based on a meta-analysis of over 130 investment game experiments, Johnson
and Mislin (2011) nd that the average fraction of rst-mover endowment
sent to second-movers is 50 percent, whereas the average proportion sent by
second-movers to rst-movers is 37 percent. In the usual multiplier condition
where the amount sent by the rst mover is trebled, it can be shown that for
any positive endowment, this ratio will always lead to higher average payos
for second movers.1
Dierences in average payos may proxy strategic power, and have been
shown to inuence how experimental participants value positions in two-
player sequential games. In an earlier study of the ultimatum game, Guth
and Tietz (1986) employed the second-price auction in an experiment eliciting
position values in the game, and found the position of rst-mover is twice as
valuable as that of second-mover. Other studies such as Homan et al. (1994)
1Denote the initial endowment amount as  where  > 0. The 50:37 ratio implies that
in cases where the second mover is allowed to send part of her endowment, her nal payo
is 1:575 (i.e. 0:63( + (3 0:5)), compared to 1:425 (i.e. 0:5 + 0:37( + (3  0:5))
for the rst mover. When the second mover cannot send her endowment (which is the
standard case), the dierence is even more pronounced, with the rst mover having a nal
payo of 1:055 (i.e. 0:5 + 0:37(3 0:5)), compared to 1:945 (i.e.  + 0:63(3 0:5))
for the second mover.
120
have considered the strategic rst mover advantage in the ultimatum game
as implicit, allowing experimental participants to compete for the position of
rst mover in an entitlement condition, as opposed to that of second mover.
One variable that has been observed to inuence the rst-mover-second-
mover payo asymmetry in sequential games is pre-play communication. In
trust games, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) argue that communication in
the form of promises from second movers enhance cooperation due to \guilt
aversion". Second movers promise to cooperate conditional on rst movers
cooperating. In a large number of cases, rst movers do cooperate, and
second movers are thus bound to make good on their promises because failure
to do so triggers a psychological cost in terms of guilt. In dictator games,
where the rst mover has absolute power and the second mover is obliged
to accept whatever fraction of initial endowment that is allocated, Andreoni
and Rao (2011) show that communication in the form of requests from second
movers is signicant in increasing donations. For them, communication from
the second mover to the rst mover increases the rst mover's empathy with
the second mover.
In both studies above, among a list of others in the literature, explana-
tions emphasize the strategic role of communication in enhancing pro-social
behavior, and thereby inuencing payo asymmetries in two-player sequen-
tial game experiments. However, a lagging question that remains is whether
non-strategic communication is just as ecient in inducing similar outcomes.
Along these lines, Roth (1995) showed that in a two-player bargaining game,
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if experimental participants are not allowed to discuss the bargaining game
at hand, then this results in signicantly higher levels of cooperation between
bargaining parties compared to the absence of communication, but not sig-
nicantly dierent to when communication is strategic. However, Roth relied
on face-to-face communication, and subsequent studies have emphasized the
need to include a visual-identication-only treatment in face-to-face commu-
nication experiments, to detect any identication-based confounds. Bohnet
and Frey (1999a) showed that in the dictator game, mutual identication,
which entails the rst- and second-mover visually identifying each other but
no verbal communication, results in signicantly higher rst-mover amounts
allocated relative to no communication and anonymity, but not signicantly
dierent to communication (i.e. where participants both visually identify
each other and communicate verbally). For Bohnet and Frey, identication
strengthens social or cultural propensities for fairness and decreases social
distance, thereby allowing the emergence of empathy for the rst mover in
the dictator game.
To obtain clean data on the eect of communication, this study employs
written anonymous communication. Additionally, so as not to explicitly con-
strain the content of communication as in Roth (1995), we propose changing
the sequence of communication so that its eect is non-strategic. Therefore,
communication occurs after the rst mover has made a binding decision, but
before the second mover has made any decisions. Communication thus can-
not change the rst-mover's decision in the period that it occurs, and this is
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common knowledge to both the rst- and second-mover. We distinguish be-
tween two communication forms: one-sided communication from the second
mover to the rst mover, and two-sided-communication.
A natural comparison to sequential games, where resulting rst-mover-
second-mover payo asymmetries are interpreted as strategic power dier-
ences, are simultaneous move symmetric games. Such games are charac-
terized by symmetry of payos and actions, and no player has a strategic
power advantage. In experiments involving the games, there is no distinc-
tion between row- and column-participants, as dened in the normal form
representations of the games. Thus, the experimentalist will usually collect
responses of paired participants and pool them when conducting subsequent
analysis, signaling an implicit belief that the row and column roles are equiv-
alent. We thus choose a simultaneous move prisoners' dilemma to represent
a balanced strategic power environment. The logical complement to the pris-
oners' dilemma is the sequential prisoners' dilemma (a version of Kreps' 1990
trust game). However, we choose a sequential move investment game, since
it is very similar to the sequential prisoners' dilemma, and it is the standard
measure of trust in the experimental economics literature. Furthermore, it
allows us to collect more detailed data on the behavior of the second mover
using the strategy method (Selten, 1967).
The investment game can be considered a form of continuous prisoners'
dilemma, and we calibrate payos in the game such that all payo pairs in
the prisoners' dilemma can be obtained by executing a particular sequence
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of play. However, there is a fundamental dierence between the two games.
As we have suggested above for symmetric simultaneous move games, in the
prisoners' dilemma, there is no rst-mover and second-mover distinction that
is present in the investment game due to symmetry of actions and payos.
Part of the reason behind why the second-mover has more strategic power
in the investment game is the fact that following the rst-movers move, the
game is eectively a dictator game in which the second-mover decides how
to allocate her total wealth between herself and the rst-mover.2
Introducing our communication sequence to the prisoners' dilemma allows
us to determine which set of players move rst, and which set move second.
Even though, temporally, this allows us to categorize rst-movers and second-
movers in this game, it still remains a simultaneous move game because what
is of strategic importance is the information that players posses about actions
of other players, which is never revealed before play concludes. Furthermore,
communication in theory allows the rst-mover to reveal her action to the
second mover. However, there is always an incentive not to reveal the truth,
which is apparent to the second mover. Thus, unlike pure coordination games
with a dominant Pareto-ecient Nash equilibrium where our sequence of
communication would allow players to coordinate on this equilibrium, in the
prisoners' dilemma this would not occur.
We show that communication has a signicant eect in inducing payo
2The term \dictator" in the dictator game explicitly hints at the extreme situation
where one player (the allocator) has absolute power.
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asymmetries in two-player symmetric games where a priori, no player has an
apparent power advantage. In the absence of communication, as we would ex-
pect, outcomes do not dier between (row) rst- and (column) second-movers
in the prisoners' dilemma, and there are no payo asymmetries. However,
rst-movers behave more cooperatively in the presence of two-sided com-
munication relative to either the absence of communication, or one-sided
communication. Second movers on the other hand do not behave as coop-
eratively in the prisoners' dilemma with two-sided communication, thereby
resulting in a payo advantage accruing to them. The sequential structure
of the investment game in the absence of communication results in signi-
cantly dierent outcomes for rst- and second-movers, in line with ndings
from previous studies. The results of communication for rst movers mainly
mirror those from the prisoners' dilemma where we observe that two-sided
communication induces higher oers. One-sided communication results in
signicantly lower levels of cooperation relative to either no-communication,
or two-sided communication, a result that mirrors that of Andreoni and Rao
(2011) in the dictator game.
The paper is organized as follows: Sec. 3.2.1 presents the experimental
design. Sec. 3.2.2 outlines our behavioral predictions. Sec 3.2.3 describes
the experimental procedures and protocols. Sec 3.3 presents the results.
Eventually, Sec. 3.4 provides a discussion and concludes.
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3.2 Method
The introduction of communication changes the structure of the investment
game and prisoner's dilemma by adding a move in the extensive form rep-
resentations of the games. The following experimental design describes the
games and details the experimental treatments and protocols.
3.2.1 Experimental design
In our setting, X represents the rst-mover in the investment game, and
row player in the prisoners' dilemma. Correspondingly, Y represents the
second-mover, and column player, respectively.
We employ the strategy method to elicit the full strategy vector of Y in
the investment game. In this game, X chooses an amount x to send to Y
from an endowment of 10, in units of 1, resulting in eleven possible amounts:
x 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : ; 10g. Before being forwarded to Y , the amount x is multiplied
by a factor of 2, so that Y receives 2x. Y , also endowed with 10, decides on
an amount y to send to X from her total wealth, that is, 10 + 2x. The only
restriction that we impose is that y must be an integer within the bounds
(y 2 Z such that 0  y  10 + 2x). A strategy of Y assigns y to each x
choice of X, and is an eleven-element vector collected by having Y ll in a
table similar to Table 3.1. The payos to X and Y , respectively, are:
X = 10  x+ y (3.1)
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Y = 10 + 2x  y: (3.2)
Table 3.1: Investment game with strategy method: Y 's decision task
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2x 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
10 + 2x 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
y           
In the prisoners' dilemma, X chooses one of two actions: aX1 = up, or
aX2 = down. In turn, Y chooses one of two actions: a
Y
1 = left , or a
Y
2 = right .
An outcome of the game is an action pair, which we denote a, where: a1 =
(aX1 ; a
Y
1 ); a
2 = (aX1 ; a
Y
2 ); a
3 = (aX2 ; a
Y
1 ), and a
4 = (aX2 ; a
Y
2 ): The payos to X
and Y , respectively, are: X = 15 and Y = 15 if the outcome is a1; X = 0
and Y = 30 if a2; X = 30 and Y = 0 if a3; and, X = 10 and Y = 10
if a4. The normal form representation in Figure 3.1 exhibits payos in the
game. As illustrated in the 22 matrix, the prisoners' dilemma is symmetric
in the sense that payos for playing a particular action depend only on the
other actions employed, not on who is playing them. We rename actions in
this game to explicitly distinguish between the actions of the row player and
the column player.
Before Y makes her decision(s), but after X has made a binding deci-
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Figure 3.1: Payos in the prisoners' dilemma
sion, there is a communication phase in each of the game experiments. We
distinguish three treatments:
NC (No Communication): The standard investment game with strategy
method, and prisoners' dilemma with a time gap between X's decision,
which occurs rst, and Y 's decision(s).
OSC (One-Sided Communication): Following X's decision, Y can choose to
unilaterally communicates to X in writing for two minutes, after which
Y makes her decision(s).
TSC (Two-Sided Communication): Following X's decision, both X and Y
can choose to communicate to each other in writing for two minutes,
after which Y makes her decision(s).
The treatments are implemented in a between-subject design. However,
due to the minimal decision tasks in the prisoners' dilemma (one decision per
participant per period), we implement both games within subjects. Thus,
participants in one session take part in a investment game followed by a
prisoners' dilemma.
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Payo Equivalence
Our design of the games is such that all payo pairs in the prisoners' dilemma
can be obtained by executing a particular sequence of play in the investment
game. This is summarized below:
 If X chooses x = 10 and Y chooses y = 15 in the investment game,
then the payo corresponds to outcome a1 in the prisoners' dilemma;
 If x = 10 and y = 0, outcome a2;
 If x = 10 and y = 30, outcome a3;
 and, if x = 0 and y = 0, outcome a4.
3.2.2 Behavioral predictions
The rational selsh prediction of behavior in the investment game and pris-
oners' dilemma is represented by the last combination of payos above (x = 0
and y = 0, and outcome a4, respectively). Applying backward induction to
determine the subgame perfect strategy, X evaluates Y in Eq. 3.2 and rec-
ognizes that it is declining in y, i.e.,

@Y
@y

< 0. Anticipating that Y will set
y = 0, nowX's payo in Eq. 3.1 becomes X
0
= 10 x, and she sets x = 0 be-
cause X
0
is declining in x, i.e.,

@X
0
@x

< 0. An analogous argument holds for
Y . In the prisoners' dilemma in Fig. 3.1, only a4 = (down; right) is a pure
strategy Nash Equilibrium outcome since X(down; right) > X(up; right),
and Y (down; right) > Y (down; left), implying that neither X nor Y has
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an incentive to deviate from the outcome.3 Neither outcome is Pareto e-
cient; for example, both X and Y are better o if X sends her full endowment
and Y returns half of her total wealth in the investment game, and both co-
operate in the Prisoners' dilemma (x = 10 and y = 15, and outcome a1,
respectively). Additionally, under selsh preferences, communication does
not inuence the predicted outcome.
Numerous studies, however, have shown that participants in one-shot in-
vestment game and prisoners' dilemma experiments do not conform to the
rational selsh prediction.4 Furthermore, communication has been observed
to increase cooperation levels in a wide range of games (see reviews by Craw-
ford, 1998; Roth, 1995). Based on previous investment game and prisoners'
dilemma studies, and the symmetry property of the prisoners' dilemma, we
predict the following outcomes for the NC treatment
H1 Some X and Y participants will send positive amounts in the investment
game, but average nal payos of Y will be higher.
H2 Some X and Y participants will choose the cooperative action in the
prisoners' dilemma, but there will be no dierence in average nal
payos.
3In the rst quadrant of the matrix, both players have an incentive to deviate from the
outcome since 15 > 0. In the second (third) quadrant, X (Y ) has an incentive to deviate
since 30 > 10.
4In repeated games, the folk theorem asserts that cooperative behavior can emerge and
be sustained if the game has an unknown end-point, and players are suciently patient.
Therefore, with frequent repeated and non-anonymous interaction, socially benecial be-
havior may endogenously develop as a result of reputation (and the ensuing threat of
punishment).
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The fact that cooperative behavior emerges even in the absence of com-
munication, and under double-blind conditions (see for example, Berg et al.
(1995), in the investment game) suggests that trust and reciprocity is a so-
cial norm. In the investment game, the rst-mover signals trust by sending a
positive amount, whereas the second mover signals trustworthiness by recip-
rocating trust. The introduction of communication additionally inuences
the trust and reciprocity dynamics in the investment game. Charness and
Dufwenberg's study reviewed in the introductory section shows how written
pre-play communication of a strategic nature can induce higher contributions
by rst movers, and enhance cooperative behavior generally. Our design rules
out eects of strategic communication on behavior, so to enable us formulate
predictions for the communication treatments, we rely on a few studies have
implemented a communication sequence similar to ours.
Xiao and Houser (2005) allow the second mover to attach a written mes-
sage to her accept/ reject decision in the ultimatum game after receiving a
binding oer from the rst mover. They observe that rst mover oers do not
dier to the standard condition, but second movers reject unfair oers sig-
nicantly less frequently. Thus, it appears that second movers expression of
negative emotions for what they perceive to be unfair oers decreases the like-
lihood that they reject such oers. This result suggests that communication
supplements costly punishment by providing an additional medium where an
aggrieved party can express her emotions. In the dictator game, Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2007) nd that rst movers (allocators) if anticipating
131
written messages from second movers (recipients) after their allocation de-
cisions, will act more other-regarding, with donations in the communication
treatment being signicantly higher to donations in the standard treatment.
Xiao and Houser (2009) replicate this result, and speculate that allocators
have a preference for avoiding written expression of disapproval, or negative
emotions, which explains their enhanced pro-social behavior.
An additional hypothesis articulated by Homan et al. (1996) is that
communication induces cooperative behavior by reducing the social distance
between interacting parties. In the absence of communication and with
anonymity, there is social isolation of an individual's decision. On the other
hand, with communication, there is a social interaction, and individuals po-
tentially have to justify their past and future choices. In dictator game studies
(for example, some of those reviewed in the introductory section), decreas-
ing social distance has been shown to increase contributions by rst movers.
However, since second movers unilaterally communicate to rst movers in
our OSC treatment, if they choose not to exercise this right (since commu-
nication is optional in the experiments), then this leaves open the possibility
that communication will not reduce the social distance between pairs of par-
ticipants. In the TSC treatment, for this to happen, it must be the case that
both paired participants choose not to communicate simultaneously, and the
odds of this happening are small. Therefore, we expect a less strong com-
munication eect in OSC relative to TSC. Based on the anticipated written
communication results highlighted, and the social distance hypothesis, we
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formulate the following hypothesis for the communication treatments:
H3 X and Y participants will act more cooperatively in TSC relative to
either OSC or NC in the investment game and prisoners' dilemma.
H4 X and Y participants will act more cooperatively in OSC relative to NC
in the investment game and prisoners' dilemma.
Cooperation rates do not automatically translate to dierences in payos
between players because it is possible to observe high levels of cooperation in
one treatment relative to another, whereas within treatments, no dierences
in rst- and second-mover payos are observed. Therefore, we formulate the
following hypothesis regarding payo asymmetries in the investment game:
H5 Dierences in the average payos of X and Y participants will always
favor Y participants, but the largest dierence will be observed in the
NC treatment, and the smallest dierence in the TSC treatment.
Therefore, the above hypothesis states that higher levels of cooperation
between players in TSC will reduce the observed asymmetry in the average
payos of the rst- and second-movers. By virtue of symmetry of actions and
payos, we do not expect that there will be an asymmetry in the average
payos of rst- and second-movers in the prisoners' dilemma within each
treatment, but based on the predicted levels of cooperation, we expect that
average payos will dier between treatments.
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H6 There will be no dierence in the average payos ofX and Y participants
within each treatment, but average payos will be highest in TSC and
lowest in NC.
3.2.3 Experimental procedures
Experimental sessions took place at the Cognitive and Experimental Eco-
nomics Laboratory (CEEL), at the University of Trento. Participants were
undergraduate students from the institution were recruited from an in-house
list of volunteers who had signed up to be considered for future participation
in experiments. Three sessions representing the aforementioned treatments
were conducted, and a session was divided into two parts, each of ve peri-
ods. The rst part of a session involved play of the investment game with
strategy method, while the second part, the prisoners' dilemma.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, each participant was randomly assigned
the role of X or Y , and maintained this role for the remainder of the session.
Before the start of each part of a session, participants were given a set of
written instructions to read through privately (see Appendix 3.5.1 for the
translated text). A member of the experimental sta thereafter read aloud
the instructions, and once it was ascertained that everyone had understood
them, the experiment started. A single-blind design was utilized, and theX 
Y pairs across periods were determined using a stranger matching protocol.
At the end of each part of a session, one of the ve periods was ran-
domly selected for payment. Each part of a session accounted for half of the
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earnings from the session, alongside a show-up fee of e 2.50. At the end
of the session, Experimental Currency Units (ECU), the exchange medium
used in the experiment, were converted to Euros at a rate of 3 ECU= e 1.
Participants received their dues in private prior to leaving the laboratory.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Choices of X
We begin with an overview of the choices of X participants across the three
treatments. Figure 3.2 summarizes the distribution of individual level aver-
age amounts sent by rst-movers in the investment game, and the proportion
of row-players choosing the cooperative action in the prisoners' dilemma.
In the former, the average amount is about twice as high in TSC compared
to NC and OSC. The non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test indicates that
this dierence (from pair-wise comparisons) is statistically signicant (p <
0:001). However, there is no signicant dierence in average amounts in
NC and OSC (p = 0:123). Correspondingly, the proportion of row player
participants who choose the cooperative action aX1 = up in the prisoners'
dilemma is higher in TSC (approx. 24%) compared to NC and OSC (approx.
7% and 9%, respectively). Wilcoxon rank-sum tests conrm that TSC and
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Figure 3.2: Choices of X participants (average at individual level for
investment game). Figures within boxes represent mean values.
NC, and TSC and OSC dier (p = 0:021, and p = 0:049, respectively),
whereas NC and OSC do not dier (p = 0:696).
Observation 8 X participants behave more cooperatively in the presence of
two-sided communication. One-sided communication has no eect on the
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behavior of X relative to no communication.
The above result establishes some consistency with regards to the ef-
fect of communication on the behavior of X participants across both games.
Whether or not two-sided communication results in more cooperation gener-
ally, depends also on the behavior of Y participants analyzed below.
Choices of Y
Figure 3.3 exhibits the distribution of individual-level average choices of Y
in the investment game conditional on potential choices of X.
For low and intermediate levels of x (i.e., 0  3 and 4  6, respectively),
average amounts are generally higher in TSC relative to either NC or OSC,
and NC relative to OSC, whereas for high levels of x (i.e., 7   10), aver-
age amounts are higher in both NC and TSC relative to OSC. A series of
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicate that the dierences are signicant for low
and intermediate levels. For high levels, the rank-sum tests show that choices
of Y do not dier between OSC and TSC, but dier between NC and OSC
and between NC and TSC.
Observation 9 The eect of two-sided communication is conditional on the
level of trust displayed by X: For low levels, Y participants cooperate more
relative to no communication, whereas behavior does not dier for high levels.
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Figure 3.3: Choices of Y participants in the investment game (average at
the individual level). Figures within boxes represent mean values.
Observation 10 One-sided communication induces lower-contributions rel-
ative to either no communication or two-sided communication, irrespective
of the level of trust displayed by X.
The proportion of column-player participants choosing the cooperative
action aY1 = left in the prisoners' dilemma is exactly equal in NC and TSC
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( 9%), and slightly lower in OSC (< 5%). Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show
that the dierence between OSC and either of the other two treatments is
not signicant ( = 0:170).
Observation 11 Generally, Y participants display low levels of cooperation
in the prisoners' dilemma, with no behavioral dierences across treatments.
Within treatment X   Y payo asymmetries
Figure 3.4 displays the average payos of X and Y participants in the pris-
oners' dilemma across treatments.
Wilcoxon rank sum tests indicate that there is no asymmetry in X and Y
average payos in NC ( = 0:561), whereas average payos are signicantly
higher for Y participants in both OSC and TSC ( = 0:059 and  = 0:005,
respectively). A between treatment comparison of payos for X participants
reveals that average payos are just only higher in NC relative to TSC ( =
0:099). For Y participants, average payos are higher in TSC relative to NC
( = 0:030).
Observation 12 Average payos of row and column participants do not dif-
fer in the absence of communication in the prisoners' dilemma. However,
with communication, average payos are higher for column participants.
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Figure 3.4: Average payos of X and Y participants across treatments in
the prisoners' dilemma. Figures within boxes represent ECU amounts.
Figure 3.5 exhibits the average payos of X and Y participants in the
investment game across treatments.
Wilcoxon rank sum tests indicate that average payos are signicantly
higher for Y participants relative to X participants in all three treatments
( < 0:001). A between treatment comparison of average payos of X par-
ticipants reveals that they dier between NC and OSC ( < 0:001), OSC
and TSC ( < 0:001), but not between NC and TSC ( = 0:112). For
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Figure 3.5: Average payos of X and Y participants across treatments in
the investment game. Figures within boxes represent ECU amounts.
Y participants, average payos are higher in TSC relative to NC and OSC
( < 0:001), but do not dier between NC and OSC ( = 0:254).
Observation 13 Average payos are higher for second movers relative to
rst movers in the investment game across all three treatments.
In relation to our behavioral predictions in Sec. 3.2.2, the results support
hypotheses H1-H2. Hypothesis H3 is supported for X participants, but not
for Y participants. Hypothesis H4 is completely rejected. Hypothesis H5 is
supported with the following qualication: dierences in average payos are
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greatest in TSC, and do not vary much between OSC and NC. Apart from
there being no dierences in X   Y payos in NC, and average Y payos
being signicantly higher in TSC , Hypothesis H6 is overwhelmingly rejected.
3.3.2 Regression analysis
We further analyze the eect of communication on participants' decision to
cooperate in the prisoners' dilemma, examining whether there are dierences
between row- and column-player participants' decisions across treatments.
Furthermore, exploiting the broader range of data on the intended behav-
ior of Y participants across all levels of X oers (provided by the strategy
method), we investigate the eect of communication on reciprocity. Our
emphasis in the investment game is not on how communication aects how
much Y participants reciprocate, but rather on how it aects their decision
to reciprocate. Therefore, we dene an indicator outcome variable
y =
8><>: 1 if y  x0 otherwise (3.3)
Our estimation model thus takes the form
pi = Probability(y
 = 1) = f(0 + 0Qi) (3.4)
where
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0Qi = 1OSCi + 2TSCi + 3x INTi + 4x HIGHi + 5Periodi:
The specication controls for the main eects of the treatments (where
NC is the baseline category), the impact of experimental periods, and the
level of trust displayed by X (where x INT is an indicator variable that takes
the value one if x 2 [4; 6], x HIGH for x 2 [7; 10], x LOW for x 2 [0; 3]; and
zero otherwise). We estimate a random intercept binomial logit model using
GLLAMM (Stata), where we account for nested random eects arising from
repeated choices of participants and their random assignment into matching
groups at each experimental period. Table 3.2 presents estimates of the
model. Beginning from a very general model (column 1), we eliminate the
insignicant interaction eects and are left with the desired model in column
2.
The results show that one-sided communication decreases the probability
of Y reciprocating relative to no communication, whereas two-sided com-
munication increases this probability. Relative to one-sided communication,
two-sided communication signicantly increases the probability of Y recip-
rocating (see W-st1). Both intermediate and higher levels of X oers de-
crease the probability of Y reciprocating relative to low levels of X oers,
with higher oers having a stronger eect (which is signicant also relative
to one-sided communication, indicated by W-st2). The interaction between
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Table 3.2: Communication and Reciprocity (Random-intercept logit)
Reciprocity Coe (Std. Err.)
(1) (2)
(Intercept) 1.081 (0.569) 1.173 (0.556)
OSC -2.364 (0.325) -2.456 (0.303)
TSC 0.530 (0.299) 0.334 (0.158)
x INT -0.526 (0.286) -0.545 (0.206)
x HIGH -0.972 (0.270) -1.188 (0.196)
Period -0.227 (0.163) -0.226 (0.162)
OSC*x INT 0.863 (0.441) 0.882 (0.394)
OSC*x HIGH 1.296 (0.416) 1.511 (0.372)
TSC*x INT -0.046 (0.413)
TSC*x HIGH -0.440 (0.386)
W -st1 81.27 82.84
W -st2 13.04 37.70
Log likelihood -720.5 -721.4
W -st1 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis OSC= TSC
W -st2 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis x INT= x HIGH
(0:01); (0:05); (0:1) signicance level
one-sided communication and the oer levels of X are signicant, whereas
the interactions with two-sided communication are not. The probability of
Y reciprocating decreases with time, but the eect is not signicant.
Observation 14 Reciprocity of Y participants depends both on the form of
communication and the trust level displayed by X. Two-sided communica-
tion has a positive eect, and one-sided communication has a negative eect.
Higher participant X oer levels decrease the likelihood of reciprocity.
To analyze the choice to cooperate in the prisoners' dilemma, we specify
the following model:
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pi = Probability(a
j
1 = Cooperate) = f(0 + 
0Si); j 2 fX; Y g (3.5)
where
0Si = 1OSCi + 2TSCi + 3X Parti + 4Periodi:
X Part in the specication above is a participant X indicator variable
which allows us to compare dierences between cooperative behavior of X
and Y participants. As previously stated, the cooperative action is aX1 = up
for X participants (row-players), and aY1 = left for Y participants (column
players).
Table 3.3: Communication and Cooperation (Random-intercept logit)
Cooperate Coe (Std. Err.)
(1) (2)
(Intercept) -1.619 (0.789) -2.268 (0.755)
OSC -1.576 (1.179) -0.400 (0.638)
TSC -0.001 (0.787) 0.999 (0.530)
X Part -0.361 (0.884) 0.887 (0.520)
Period -0.411 (0.195) -.397 (0.187)
OSC*X Part 1.925 (1.452)
TSC*X Part 1.777 (1.104)
W -st1 2.01 6.85
Log likelihood -77.6 -79.2
W -st1 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis OSC= TSC
(0:01); (0:05); (0:1) signicance level
Beginning with the very general model in column 1, we eliminate insignif-
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icant interactions until we are left with the desired model in column 2. From
the results, we observe that one-sided communication has no signicant eect
on the probability that a participant chooses the cooperative action in the
prisoners' dilemma relative to no communication, whereas two-sided com-
munication increases this probability. In addition, two-sided communication
relative to one-sided communication also increases the probability that a par-
ticipant chooses the cooperative action (see W-st1). Being an X participant
increases the probability of choosing the cooperative action relative to being
a Y participant. Finally, it emerges that the probability of choosing the co-
operative action declines over time as participants acquire more experience.
Observation 15 The probability of choosing the cooperative action in the
prisoners' dilemma is positively related to two-sided communication and being
temporally the rst mover, and negatively related to experience.
Our nal analysis looks at the eect of communication on how protable
trust is for X participants in the investment game. To measure this prof-
itability of trust, we dene the following outcome variable which computes
the rate of return on the amount that X forwards to Y .
Rate of return (%) =
y
x
  1

 100; x 6= 0 (3.6)
We estimate a random intercept linear model with the same set of regres-
sors in Table 3.2, restricting our sample to strictly positive values of y (i.e.,
y > 0).
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Table 3.4: Communication and protability of trust (random-intercept
linear)
Rate of return (%) Coe (Std. Err.)
Reciprocators (y > 0)
(Intercept) 55.989 (15.846)
OSC -73.244 (15.931)
TSC 75.206 (12.610)
x INT -59.753 (12.379)
x HIGH -77.884 (11.559)
Period -1.162 (4.111)
OSC*x INT 39.255 (20.261)
OSC*x HIGH 61.491 (19.078)
TSC*x INT -52.341 (17.172)
TSC*x HIGH -76.055 (16.088)
W -st1 97.52
W -st2 46.84
Log likelihood -5430.5
W -st1 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis OSC= TSC
W -st2 : Wald statistic for the hypothesis x INT= x HIGH
(0:01); (0:05); (0:1) signicance level
The results show that like reciprocity, both one-sided communication,
intermediate- and high-oer levels of X (relative to low oer levels) have a
negative eect on the protability of trust, whereas two-sided communication
has a positive eect. All interaction terms are signicant, implying that eect
of communication depends on the level of trust displayed by X, in both cases
with higher levels corresponding to stronger eects of communication. Period
is not signicant, as was the case in Table 3.2.
Observation 16 The protability of trust depends mainly on the same fac-
tors that aect reciprocity of Y participants. However, unlike reciprocity, the
form of communication interacts with the levels of trust displayed by X.
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3.4 Discussion
Before delving into other themes, it may be benecial to rst address the
main focus of this study which is the strategic advantage that arises from
the structure of sequential games, and how communication aects this. As
expected, we nd that our results for the no communication treatments
are consistent with those from previous studies: there are no behavioral
dierences between rst-movers (row players), and second-movers (column
players) in the prisoners' dilemma, whereas second-movers are signicantly
better o (in payo terms) relative to rst-movers in the investment game.
However, we observe that once we introduce communication into the mix,
rst-mover behavior in the investment game does not dier between the
no-communication- and one-sided-communication treatments, whereas rst-
movers make signicantly higher oers in the presence of two-sided com-
munication. In the prisoners' dilemma, we also observe a similar pattern:
rst-movers (row players) choose the cooperative action more than twice
as often in the two-sided communication treatment relative to either the
one-sided- or no-communication-treatment. This result leaves us to explain
why two-sided communication signicantly induces rst movers to cooperate
across both games, whereas one sided communication does not. Previous
studies suggest that our communication sequence can account for this pat-
tern of behavior. The anticipated communication ndings of Ellingsen and
Johannesson (2007) and Xiao and Houser (2009) reviewed under our behav-
148
ioral predictions (Sec. 3.2.2) showed that in dictator games, if rst movers
anticipate written communication from second movers following their alloca-
tion decision, their donations are signicantly higher relative to the standard
no-communication condition. However, unlike the dictator game where the
only motivation for the rst mover to donate is altruism, it appears from our
results that this anticipation eect extends to environments where there are
strategic considerations, for example, whether the second mover reciprocates
in the investment game, or whether she in turn cooperates in the prisoners'
dilemma.
The one-sided communication result for rst movers replicates the behav-
ior of second movers under the same condition, and is best addressed in a
more general context. Second movers in the prisoners' dilemma choose the co-
operative action with signicantly less frequency, resulting in no dierences in
cooperation rates across all three treatments. In the investment game, on the
other hand, the eect of two-sided communication is conditional on the rst
mover's oer level: for low levels (0 30% of endowment), second movers send
higher amounts relative to both one-sided and no-communication. However,
for high levels (70   100% of endowment), behavior in the two-sided com-
munication treatment does not dier with the no-communication treatment.
On the other hand, one-sided communication, relative to either two-sided-
communication or no-communication, results in signicantly lower amounts
sent by second movers. This result that one sided communication leads to
the same or lower levels of cooperation relative to no communication repli-
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cates what could have been an easily overlooked result by Andreoni and
Rao (2011). In their study, they found that in dictator games where the
allocator sends a written message to the recipient along with the allocated
amount (and the recipient stays silent), the amount allocated is signicantly
lower relative to all other treatments (no communication, two-sided commu-
nication, and one-sided communication from recipient). To summarize this
result in a general context, when a decision maker is allowed to unilaterally
communicate prior to making her allocation decision, she behaves less other-
regarding. Our results additionally suggest that this self-regarding behavior
extends to environments where strategic considerations are present, and is
not isolated to the dictator game.
We follow Andreoni and Rao's intuition of this result. A better way to
think about this is to ask why are cooperation levels higher with two sided
communication? Somehow, it must be the case that two-sided communica-
tion is aecting the utility function of the decision maker. If we consider
an Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) utility function for the decision maker,
where utility is split between consumption utility and social utility, two sided
communication aects the social utility component. In this framework, the
decision maker not only cares about fairness, but also gains additional utility
if others perceive her to be fair, and perceptions depend on how much she de-
cides to give. Andreoni and Rao hypothesize that if the allocator unilaterally
communicates to the recipient in the dictator game, then this disrupts the
empathy-altruism mechanism, or more generally self- and social-signalling.
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Thus, our replication of Andreoni and Rao's result in a non-dictator-game
context suggests that social utility remains an important consideration even
in the presence of strategic considerations, such as reciprocity.
The rich data aorded by the strategy method in the investment game
allowed us to gain an in depth analysis of how communication aects the
reciprocity of second movers, and the protability of trust, which is depen-
dent on rst mover oer levels and the corresponding responses of second
movers. We found that intermediate- (40   60% of endowment) and high-
rst mover oers decrease the probability that second movers reciprocate, as
does one-sided communication, whereas two-sided communication increases
the probability that second movers reciprocate. The protability of trust
on the other hand is mainly inuenced by the same factors, except that the
form of communication interacts with the levels of rst mover oers, implying
that eect of communication is dependent on how much rst movers choose
to send.
In conclusion, this paper has identied and implemented an experimen-
tal design that examines the eect of non-strategic communication form on
the strategic advantage that arises from the structure of sequential games.
A sequential move investment game, and a simultaneous move prisoners'
dilemma were chosen to represent an asymmetric power environment, and
a balanced power environment, respectively. Previous studies have shown
that second-movers in the investment game are strategically better o in
payo terms relative to rst-movers. In the prisoners' dilemma, even though
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players can make their moves at dierent points in time applying our com-
munication sequence, symmetry of actions and payos, and the information
available to players at the time they make their moves implies that there
is no strategic advantage to being either a rst- or second-mover (i.e., the
game is still a simultaneous move game despite the fact that moves are not
themselves simultaneous in time). We show that anticipated communication
has a signicant eect in inducing payo asymmetries (and hence power dif-
ferences) in symmetric games. This anticipated communication eect cannot
be attributed to the fact that we temporally separate the move of the row-
and column-player in the prisoners' dilemma, since the no-communication
treatment shows that even with such a separation, in the absence of commu-
nication, outcomes do not dier between rst- and second-movers.
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Instructions (Translation from Italian)
PART A: General
Thank you for taking the time to attend this session. If you have any ques-
tions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will assist you.
You are not allowed to talk to anyone else in the room except for the exper-
imenters.
You will receive a show-up fee of e2.50 for taking part in this session. In
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addition, you have the opportunity to earn more money depending on the
decisions that you and others make during the session. At the end of the
session, you will personally be paid the sum of your show-up fee and earnings
in private.
The experiment will take place on a computer where you will be paired
with a dierent participant at each period. There will be a total of ten peri-
ods. At no point during or after the experiment will you know the identities
of participants that you are paired with across the periods.
PART A: Decision tasks - NC
At the very beginning, the computer will randomly assign you either the role
of X or Y . Once this assignment is complete, you will remain in that role
for the remainder of the session. If you are assigned the role of X, you will
be paired with a participant assigned the role of Y , and vice-versa. Your
earnings will depend on the decisions that you make in your pair.
The session will be divided into two sections of 5 periods. When the rst
ve periods are over, you will receive instructions for periods 6{10. Therefore,
the following decision tasks relate ONLY to the rst ve periods.
All participants will be endowed with a sum of 10 Experimental Currency
Units (ECU) at the start of each period. On the computer screen, participant
X will decide how much of his or her endowment to send to participant Y by
choosing one the following eleven options:
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0 ECU 1 ECU 2 ECU 3 ECU 4 ECU 5 ECU 6 ECU 7 ECU 8 ECU 9 ECU 10 ECU
The choice of participantX is denoted x. The amount x will be multiplied
by a factor of 2 before being sent to participant Y , so that participant Y
receives 2x. Not knowing the actual choice of participant X, for each of the
eleven possible x choices of participant X, participant Y has to decide on an
amount y to send to participant X from his or her total wealth, that is, the
initial endowment of 10 ECU plus double the amount sent by participant X.
Participant Y will thus ll in the y values in a table similar to the one below:
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2x 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
10 + 2x 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
y           
The only restrictions on the y values is that they must be whole numbers.
Otherwise, participant Y can ll in any amount ranging from 0 ECU to his
or her maximum wealth, indicated by the value of 10+2x at each column in
the table.
ParticipantX's choice! ParticipantY 's decisions.
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PART A: Decision tasks - OSC
[Decision task text as in NC above]
A Message
Participant Y has the option to send a message(s) to participant X prior
to deciding the amounts y corresponding to each of the eleven possible x
choices of participant X. However, the message(s) will be after participant
X has chosen the amount x to send to participant Y . The following sequence
illustrates the chronology of events:
X chooses! optional message(s) from Y to X ! Y 's decisions
There will be a message window on the computer screen where participant
Y can write a message(s) to participant X within the two minute time-gap
between participant X's choice and participant Y 's decision. If participant
Y does not intend to send a message(s) to participant X, then he or she
can click on the button labeled \no message" in the computer screen. If this
happens, then participant X will be notied that participant Y has chosen
not to send any message(s). At any point within the allotted two minutes,
participant Y can send a message(s) to participant X regardless of whether
he or she had earlier opted not to do so.
In the message(s), participant Y is not allowed to identify him or herself.
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Therefore, he or she cannot include personal details such as name, gender,
appearance, age, address, phone number, and program or year of study. In
addition, the use of oensive language is not allowed. (Experimenters will
monitor the message(s). Violations (to the discretion of the experimenters)
will result in participant Y forfeiting the e2.50 show-up fee and leaving the
session with no earnings. The paired participant X will receive the average
amount received by other X participants.) Apart from these restrictions,
participant Y may say anything that he or she wishes in the message(s).
PART A: Decision tasks - TSC
[Decision task text as in NC above]
Messages
Both participant X and participant Y have the option of sending messages
to each other prior to participant Y deciding the amounts y corresponding to
each of the eleven possible x choices of participant X. However, the messages
will be after participant X has chosen the amount x to send to participant
Y . The following sequence illustrates the chronology of events:
X chooses! optional message(s) between X and Y ! Y 's decisions
There will be a message window on the computer screen where both
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participant X and participant Y can send messages to each other within
the two minute time-gap between participant X's choice and participant Y 's
decisions. If either participant X or participant Y does not intend to send
a message(s) to the other, then he or she can click on the button labeled
\no message" in the computer screen. If this happens, then then the paired
participant will be notied that either participant X or participant Y has
chosen not to send any message(s). At any point within the allotted two
minutes, participantX and participant Y can send a message(s) to the paired
participant regardless of whether they had earlier opted not to do so.
In the message(s), both participant X and participant Y are not allowed
to identify themselves. Therefore, they cannot include personal details such
as name, gender, appearance, age, address, phone number, and program
or year of study. In addition, the use of oensive language is not allowed.
(Experimenters will monitor the message(s). Violations (to the discretion of
the experimenters) will result in the violating participant forfeiting the e2.50
show-up fee and leaving the session with no earnings. The paired participant
will receive the average amount received by other X or Y participants.)
Apart from these restrictions, both participant X and participant Y may
say anything that they wish in the messages.
PART A: Earnings - General
Out of the ve periods, one period will be randomly selected for payment.
ECU will be exchanged at a rate of 3 ECU = e1. The earnings in the
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randomly selected period will constitute half of the earnings from the experi-
ment, the other half having being determined in periods 1{5. Therefore, nal
payments at the end of the experiment for each participant X and partici-
pant Y will be the sum of the show-up fee, 0.5  (earnings in periods 1{5),
and 0.5  (earnings in periods 6{10).
PART B: General
The following instructions relate to the second section of the experiment
(periods 6{10). If you were assigned the role of X or Y in periods 1{5, you
remain in this role for the remainder of the experiment.
You will be paired with a dierent participant at each period, and at no
point during or after the experiment will you know the identities of partici-
pants that you are paired with across the periods. Your earnings will depend
on the decisions that you make in your pair.
PART B: Decision tasks - NC
ParticipantX will choose one of two actions { up or down { from the following
matrix:
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where numbers in the matrix represent ECU. Not knowing the action
chosen by participant X, participant Y will choose an action { left or right
{ from the same matrix. The payo at each period is determined as follows:
 If participant X chooses up and participant Y chooses left, then each
gets 15 ECU.
 If participant X chooses up and participant Y chooses right, then par-
ticipant X gets 0 ECU and participant Y gets 30 ECU.
 If participant X chooses down and participant Y chooses left, then
participant X gets 30 ECU and participant Y gets 0 ECU.
 Finally, if participant X chooses down and participant Y chooses right,
then each gets 10 ECU.
Participant X's choice! Participant Y 's choice.
PART B: Decision tasks - OSC
[Decision task text as in NC above]
A Message
Participant Y has the option to send a message(s) to participant X prior
to choosing an action. However, the message(s) will be after participant X
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has chosen an action. The following sequence illustrates the chronology of
events:
X chooses an action! optional message(s) from Y to X ! Y chooses an action
There will be a message window on the computer screen where participant
Y can write a message(s) to participant X within the two minute time-gap
between participant X's choice and participant Y 's choice. If participant Y
does not intend to send a message(s) to participant X, then he or she can
click on the button labeled \no message" in the computer screen. If this
happens, then participant X will be notied that participant Y has chosen
not to send any message(s). At any point within the allotted two minutes,
participant Y can send a message(s) to participant X regardless of whether
he or she had earlier opted not to do so.
In the message(s), participant Y is not allowed to identify him or herself.
Therefore, he or she cannot include personal details such as name, gender,
appearance, age, address, phone number, and program or year of study. In
addition, the use of oensive language is not allowed. (Experimenters will
monitor the message(s). Violations (to the discretion of the experimenters)
will result in participant Y forfeiting the e2.50 show-up fee and leaving the
session with no earnings. The paired participant X will receive the average
amount received by other X participants.) Apart from these restrictions,
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participant Y may say anything that he or she wishes in the message(s).
PART B: Decision tasks - TSC
[Decision task text as in NC above]
Messages
Both participant X and participant Y have the option of sending messages to
each other prior to participant Y choosing an action. However, the messages
will be after participant X has chosen an action. The following sequence
illustrates the chronology of events:
X chooses an action! optional message(s) between X and Y ! Y chooses an action
There will be a message window on the computer screen where both
participant X and participant Y can send messages to each other within
the two minute time-gap between participant X's choice and participant Y 's
choice. If either participant X or participant Y does not intend to send
a message(s) to the other, then he or she can click on the button labeled
\no message" in the computer screen. If this happens, then then the paired
participant will be notied that either participant X or participant Y has
chosen not to send any message(s). At any point within the allotted two
minutes, participantX and participant Y can send a message(s) to the paired
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participant regardless of whether they had earlier opted not to do so.
In the message(s), both participant X and participant Y are not allowed
to identify themselves. Therefore, they cannot include personal details such
as name, gender, appearance, age, address, phone number, and program
or year of study. In addition, the use of oensive language is not allowed.
(Experimenters will monitor the message(s). Violations (to the discretion of
the experimenters) will result in the violating participant forfeiting the e2.50
show-up fee and leaving the session with no earnings. The paired participant
will receive the average amount received by other X or Y participants.)
Apart from these restrictions, both participant X and participant Y may
say anything that they wish in the messages.
PART B: Earnings - General
Out of the ve periods, one period will be randomly selected for payment.
ECU will be exchanged at a rate of 3 ECU = e1. The earnings in the
randomly selected period will constitute half of the earnings from the experi-
ment, the other half having being determined in periods 1{5. Therefore, nal
payments at the end of the experiment for each participant X and partici-
pant Y will be the sum of the show-up fee, 0.5  (earnings in periods 1{5),
and 0.5  (earnings in periods 6{10).
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